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ARTICLE
TRANSSEXUALISM AND THE BINARY DIVIDE:
DETERMINING SEX USING OBJECTIVE CRITERIA
Mathew D. Stavert
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1965, when Jewell Akens debuted the hit song, The Birds and the Bees,
the American pop culture gave no second thought to the lyric "a girl and a
guy." ' Differentiating between a man and a woman, and the natural attraction
to the opposite sex, seemed simple enough. In 1969, however, Johns Hopkins
University opened the nation's first clinic to perform so-called sex reassignment
surgery (hereinafter "SRS") on males wanting to be females and females
wanting to be males.2 When a follow-up study of transsexuals treated by the
clinic severally criticized the legitimacy of SRS,3 the program was immediately
shut down, and other university-sponsored clinics followed suit like dominos.4
Now, due to the emergence of private clinics performing SRS, a debate has
emerged over whether the law should classify postoperative transsexuals as
their desired sex or their birth sex for purposes of marriage.5
t Mathew D. Staver, B.A. 1980, Southern Missionary College, M.A. 1982, Andrews
University, J.D. 1987, University of Kentucky, LL.D. 2006 (honoris causa), Liberty University,
is Founder and Chairman of Liberty Counsel, a public interest litigation, education and policy
organization. He is also Dean and Professor of Law at Liberty University School of Law. Staver
was lead counsel on the internationally publicized case known as Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884
So.2d 155 (Fla. App. 2004) reh "g denied (2004), review denied (Fla. 2005), which dealt with
the determination of a person's sex for purposes of marriage.
1. JEWEL AKENS, THE BIRDS AND THE BEES (Era Records 1965).
2. RcHARD GREEN & JOHN MONEY, TRANSSEXUALISM & SEX REASSIGNMENT (1969).
3. See Jon K. Meyer, et al., Sex Reassignment: Follow-up, 36 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY
1015 (1979). Dr. Meyer served as the Director of the Gender Identity Clinic and Chair of the
Gender Identity Committee at Johns Hopkins University, where he developed his research
interests in gender and sexual identities. In June 2004, Dr. Meyer was elected to a two-year
term as president of the American Psychoanalytic Association.
4. Ellen Makkai, The Sex-Change Charade, available at http://www.worldnetdaily.com
news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=30442 (last visited Sept. 6,2008); see also Garrett Oppenheim,
Hopkins Policy on Sex Change in Fog After Follow-Up Study, 11 TRANSrION (July/Aug./Sept.
1979).
5. The words "sex" and "gender" will be used interchangeably to mean the same thing.
Some transsexual advocates have attempted to differentiate between the two, arguing that "sex"
refers more to biology and physiology and "gender" refers to the expression of maleness or
femaleness. See e.g., Julie A. Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex Categories: A
Comparison of the Multiracial and Transgendered Experience, 39 SAN DEEGo L. REv. 917
(2002); Julie A. Greenberg, When is a Man a Man, and When is a Woman a Woman?, 52 FLA.
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 459 2007-2008
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The legal status of postoperative transsexuals for purposes of marriage is an
important issue for both marriage and sex-based classifications. If sex can be
changed like clothes, then law defining marriage or granting protected status on
account of sex will become meaningless. In addressing the legal status of
postoperative transsexuals, Section I of this article will begin by recognizing the
longstanding marriage laws in the United States that sanction marriage only
between one man and one woman. Section II will then discuss in some detail
the medical issues involving sex and sexual disorders, and will also discuss
whether sex should be defined biologically or psychologically for purposes of
marriage.
II. THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized traditional male-
female marriage as "the foundation of the family and society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress."6 Justice Holmes observed
"some form of permanent association between the sexes" is one of the
rudimentary characteristics of civilization.7 The "structure of society itself
largely depends upon the institution of marriage [which is founded upon the]
joining of the man and woman .... ,,8 In "every enlightened government,"
marriage "is pre-eminently the basis of civil institutions, and thus an object of
the deepest public concem." 9
L. REv. 725 (2000); Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the
Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 265 (1999); Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-
orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219,227-
28 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5 (1995). See also Rebecca
Moskow, Broader Legal Implications of Transsexual Sex Determination Cases, 71 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1421 (2003). Such a distinction lacks merits. See David Lee Mundy, Hitting Below the
Belt: Sexploitive Ideology and the Disaggregation of Sex and Gender, 14 REGENT U. L. REv.
215 (2001); Teresa A. Zakaria, By Any Other Name: Defining Male and Female in Marriage
Statutes, 3 AvE MAA L. REv. 349 (2005).
6. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888). The Supreme Court has said that "no
legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in the founding of a free, self-
governing commonwealth, fit to take rank as one of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than
that which seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and
springing from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony;
the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that
reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in social and political
improvement." Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15,45 (1885).
7. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REv. 40, 41 (1918).
8. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976).
9. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 213.
[Vol. 2:459
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A. The Laws of the Several States Recognize Only Traditional Marriage
No state has legislatively authorized same-sex marriage.10 On the contrary,
forty-five states expressly prohibit it." Forty states have passed specific
10. On November 18, 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court became the first
court to sanction same-sex marriage. This decision was implemented 180 days later on May 17,
2004. See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
11. States that expressly ban same sex marriage by statute or constitutional amendment:
ALA. CONST. amend. 774; ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (1998); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ALASKA
STAT. § 25.05.013 (1996); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (1996); ARK. CONST. amend. 83; ARK.
CODE § 9-11-107, 109 and 208 (1997); Cal. Fain. Code § 308.5 (2000); Colo. Const. art. II, §
31; COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2000); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-727a; DEL. CODE tit. 13 § 101
(1996); FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (1997); Ga. Const. art. I, § IV; Ga. Code § 19-3-3.1 (1996); HAw.
CONST. Art. 1, § 23; HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1, and 1.6 (1994); IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28;
IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/212 and 5/213.1 (1996); IND. CODE §
31-11-1-1 (1997); IOWA CODE § 595.2 (1998); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16; KAN. STAT. § 23-101
(1996); Ky. CONST. § 233A; KY. REV. STAT. § 402.020, 040 and 045 (1998); LA. CONST. art.
XII, § 15; LA. CIV. CODE art. 86, 89, and 3520; LA. REV. STAT. § 9:272, 273 and 275 (1999);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A § 701 (1997); MICH.
CONST. art I, § 25; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.1 and .271 (1996); MINN. STAT. § 517.01 and .03
(1997); MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263A; MISS. CODE § 93-1-1 (1997); MO. ANN. STAT. CONST.
art. 1, § 33; Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (1996); MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; MONT. CODE § 40-
1-401 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. CONST. art. I, § 29; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1,2,3 (1987);
NEV. CONST., art. I, § 21; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (1996); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (1997); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OHio REV. CODE § 3101.01
(2004); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 35; OKLA. STAT. tit. 43 § 3.1 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. CONST. Art.
XV, § 5a; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 and 1704 (1996); S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 5; S.C. CODE §
20-1-15 (1996); S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-land 1-38 (1996);
TENN. CODE § 36-3-113 (1996); TEx. CONST. art. I, § 32; TEX. FAM. CODE § 2.001 (2003); UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 29; UTAH CODE § 30-1-2 (2004); VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; Va. Code § 20-45.2
(1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 5,6, 8 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 and 020 (1998);
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-104 and 603 (2001); WIS. CONST. Art. 13, § 13; and Wyo. STAT. ANN. §
20-1-101 (1977).
States with post-1994 statutory bans on same-sex marriage: Arizona, California, Delaware,
Florida, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington, Wisconsin,
and West Virginia.
States with both statutory and constitutional bans on same-sex marriage: Alaska, Alabama,
Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.
States with only constitutional bans on same-sex marriage: Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon and
Wisconsin,
Three states have statutes which pre-date the mid-1990's DOMA legislation movement
expressly defining marriage between one man and one woman: Maryland, New Hampshire, and
Wyoming.
Two states ban same-sex marriage, but allow civil unions: Vermont and Connecticut.
2008]
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Defense of Marriage Acts (hereinafter "DOMA") or constitutional amendments
since 1994, expressly limiting marriage to one man and one woman. Hawaii
followed its 1994 statutory definition of marriage with a constitutional
amendment in 1998 to ensure that the definition of marriage remained the sole
province of the legislative branch. 2  Since the passage of constitutional
amendments by Alaska and Hawaii in 1998, other states including Nebraska
(2000), Nevada (2002), Missouri (2004), Louisiana (2004), Oregon (2004),
Kentucky (2004), Michigan (2004), Mississippi (2004), Georgia (2004), North
Dakota (2004), Ohio (2004), Oklahoma (2004), Arkansas (2004), Montana
(2004), Utah (2004), Kansas (2005), Texas (2005), Alabama (2006), Colorado
(2006), Idaho (2006), South Carolina (2006), South Dakota (2006), Tennessee
(2006), Virginia (2006), and Wisconsin (2006) have also used the amendment
process to ban same-sex marriage.' 3 Although Vermont passed the nation's first
same-sex civil union law in 2000, its statutory scheme limits marriage to one
man and one woman. 14 Several statutes which address incestuous marriages
12. See HAw. CONST. art. 1, § 23. The referendum was in response to the Hawaii Supreme
Court's decision which stated that a ban on same-sex marriage must survive strict scrutiny under
the Hawaii constitution. See Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999); see also Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993). Prior to the
referendum, in 1994, the legislature had declared that marriage is limited to one man and one
woman. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (marriage is "only between a man and a woman").
13. See ALA. CONST. amend. 774; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARK. CONST. amend. 83;
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; GA. CONST. art. I, § IV; HAW. CONST. Art. 1, § 23; IDAHO CONST. art.
III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16; KY. CONST. § 233A; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH.
CONST. art I, § 25; Miss. CONST. art. XIV, § 263A; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art.
XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO
CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; S.C. CONST. art.
XVII, § 5; S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 32; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18;
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; and Wis. CONST. art. XIII, § 13.The Alaska
referendum was in response to the state court's decision in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics,
1998 WL 88743 (Super. Ct. Alaska), which held that a restriction on marriage must survive
strict scrutiny under the Alaska constitution. The constitutional amendment overruled the
Brause decision. In six states, Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, Louisiana, Arizona, and Colorado,
courts have held that proposed constitutional amendments defining marriage as "one man and
one woman" do not violate the single-subject rule. Although not ruling on the single-subject
rule, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the state may proceed with a
constitutional amendment defining marriage as "one man and one woman," even if it requires
overruling a decision by the state's highest court. See Schulman v. Attorney General, 447 Mass.
189 (2006).
14. Vermont statutes provide for "civil marriage" for opposite-sex partners and "civil
unions" for same-sex partners. The statutes expressly state that a "civil union" is not a "civil
marriage." See VT. STAT. tit. 15 § 8; VT. STAT. tit. 15 § 1201(4) (The civil union law
specifically states that while "a system of civil unions does not bestow the status of civil
[Vol. 2:459
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thereby assume that marriage is only between a man and a woman.' 5 A few
merely discuss marriage in general terms as a relationship between husband and
wife or male and female.
16
In addition to the overwhelming statutory authority, a number of state courts,
even in the absence of an express statute, have rejected same-sex marriage. 17 In
marriage, it does satisfy the requirements of the Common Benefits Clause [under the Vermont
Constitution]." VT. H.B. § 1(1)(10) (2000)).
15. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-21 AND 25; MASS. GEN. LAWS 207 § 1-2; N.J. STAT.
§37:1-1; N.M. STAT. § 40-1-1; N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 5; OlO REv. CODE § 3101.01; OR. REV.
STAT. § 106.010 and 020; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1.
16. See WIs. STAT. § 765.01 (husband and wife); Wvo. STAT. § 20-1-101 (male and
female).
17. See e.g., Alabama: In re: H.H., 830 So. 2d 21,26 (Ala. 2002) ("homosexual conduct of
a parent-conduct involving a sexual relationship between two persons of the same gender-
creates a strong presumption of unfitness that alone is sufficient justification for denying that
parent custody of his or her own children or prohibiting the adoption of the children of others")
(Moore, J. concurring); Alaska: Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Super. Ct.
Alaska) (overruled by constitutional amendment); Arizona: Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel
County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. App. 2003); Arkansas: May v. Daniels, 2004 WL
2250882 (Ark.); California: Smelt v. County of Orange, California, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir.
2006); Colorado: Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111
(1982) (male America citizen and male Australian alien who had been ceremonially "married"
by a minister in Colorado does not qualify alien as citizen's spouse); Connecticut: Rosengarten
v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App.), cert. granted in part but dismissing case as moot upon
death of the party, 806 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2002) (a Vermont civil union is not "marriage"
recognized under this state because the union was not entered into between one man and one
woman); Kerrigan v. State, 2006 WL 2089468 (Conn. Super. 2006); Delaware: no cases;
District of Columbia: Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (marriage statute
prohibited clerk from issuing license to same-sex couple and same-sex marriage is not a
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause); Florida: Frandsen v. County of
Brevard, 800 So. 2d 757, 759, 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), rev. denied, 828 So. 2d 386 (Fla.
2002) (classifications based on sex are not subject to strict scrutiny, noting that the Constitution
Revision Commission refused to add the term "sex" to the Florida constitution so as to avoid
any possibility that Florida courts might conclude the provision required recognition of same-
sex marriages); Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) reh "g denied
(2004), review denied (Fla. 2005), (rejecting transsexual marriage based on Florida DOMA
which bans same-sex marriage); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005);
Georgia: Bums v. Bums, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. App.), reconsideration denied, cert. denied (2002)
(a Vermont civil union is not marriage, and even if it were, Georgia would not recognize it as
such, because the state authorizes only the union of one man and one woman and prohibits
same-sex marriage); Hawaii: Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), affd, 950 P.2d 1234
(Haw. 1997) (authorizing strict scrutiny for marriage classifications but decision was overruled
by constitutional referendum); Idaho: no cases; Illinois: In re Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201,
206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (challenge to statute proscribing same-sex marriage was moot and
petitioner was never legally married-"[W]e cannot retroactively redefine petitioner and Hall's
2008]
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relationship as a lawful marriage or even confer the benefits of a legal marriage upon their
relationship. If we did, we would essentially be resurrecting common law marriage...");
Indiana: Morrison v. Sadler, 2003 WL 23119998 (Ind. Super. Ct.), cert. denied, (dismissing
challenge to Indiana's DOMA which limits marriage to one man and one woman); Iowa: no
cases; Kansas: In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002) (a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual is not a woman within the meaning of the statutes recognizing marriage, and
thus a marriage of a male-to-female transsexual to another male is void); Kentucky: Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (a same-sex union is not recognized as marriage);
Louisiana: Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So.2d 715 (La. 2005) (the state
constitutional amendment that prohibited same-sex marriage did not violate the single object
rule of the state constitution); Maine; no cases; Maryland: Conaway v. Deane; 932 A.2d 571
(Md. 2007) (upholding the law that prohibits issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples);
Massachusetts: Albano v. Attorney General, 769 N.E.2d 1242 (Mass. 2002) (initiative for
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage permissible); Goodrich v. Department of
Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (first court to sanction same-sex marriage);
Michigan: no cases; Minnesota: Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186, 187 (Minn. 1971)
(upholding statute which authorizes marriage between persons of the same sex, stating "The
institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and
rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis" and recognizing "there is a
clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the
fundamental difference in sex."); Mississippi: no cases; Missouri: no cases; Montana: no cases;
Nebraska: Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 2006 WL 1933417 (8th Cir. 2006);
Nevada: no cases; New Hampshire: no cases; New Jersey: M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. App.
1976) (male transsexual who underwent sex-reassignment surgery may not be considered female
for marital purposes); In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 (N.J. App. 2001) (change of name to
include last name of same-sex partner was not for an inappropriate purpose); New Mexico: no
cases; New York: Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y App. Div. 1971) (a
marriage between two males was a nullity notwithstanding that "husband" believed "wife" was a
female at the time of the ceremony, and notwithstanding that "she" had subsequent sex surgery);
Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) ("same-sex marriage ... is not
presently recognized under the laws of any state of the Union", the "long tradition of marriage,
understood as the union of male and female, testifies to a contrary political, cultural, religious
and legal consensus [opposed to same-sex marriage.] We conclude that New York does not
recognize or authorize same sex marriage and that the City Clerk correctly refused to issue the
license."); In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684,688 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) ("the state has a
compelling interest in fostering the traditional institution of marriage ( whether based on self-
preservation, procreation, or nurturing and keeping alive the concept of marriage and family as a
basic fabric of our society), as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization, which
institution is deeply rooted and long established in firm and rich societal values" and thus same-
sex marriage is not authorized); Hebel v. West, 803 N.Y.S. 2d 242 (N.Y.A.D. 2005); Hernandez
v. Robles, Samuels v. New York, Kane v. Marsolais and, Seymour v. Holcomb (consolidated)
2006 WL 1835429 (N.Y. 2006) North Carolina: no cases; North Dakota: no cases; Ohio: In re
Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 2002) (cohabiting same-sex partner of biological mother was
not a "parent"); In re Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App.) (refusing
to recognize transsexual marriage based on statute that authorizes only opposite-sex marriage);
In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. 1987) ("There is no authority in Ohio for the
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 464 2007-2008
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2004, a Florida court of appeals voided the "marriage" of a postoperative
transsexual.' 8 The Kansas Supreme Court in 2002 also voided the "marriage"
of a man with a male-to-female transsexual.' 9 Viewing "the issue in this appeal
to be one of law and not of fact" and noting that the "fundamental rule of
statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs," the court
invalidated the transsexual "marriage. 2°
Rejecting same-sex marriage, a Kentucky court noted that marriage "was a
custom long before the state commenced to issue licenses for that purpose,"
noting "marriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a
woman .... ,21 The Supreme Court of Minnesota found that its statute, which
bans same-sex marriage, did not offend the First, Eighth, Ninth or Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, holding that "there is a clear
distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based
upon the fundamental difference in sex."22 A New York court noted that the
state "law makes no provision for a 'marriage' between persons of the same
sex. Marriage is and always has been a contract between a man and a
woman."
23
Accordingly, the court declares that the so-called marriage ceremony
in which the plaintiff and defendant took part.., did not in fact or
issuance of a marriage license to consummate a marriage between a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual person and a male person"); Oklahoma: no cases; Oregon: Li v. Oregon, 110
P.3d 91 (Or. 2005); Pennsylvania: De Santo v. Barnsly, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(two persons of the same sex cannot contract a common-law marriage); Rhode Island: no cases;
South Carolina: no cases; South Dakota: no cases; Tennessee: no cases; Texas: Littleton v.
Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 870 (2000) (ceremonial
"marriage" between a man and a transsexual born as a man, who was surgically and chemically
altered to have the physical characteristics of a woman, is not valid); Utah: no cases; Vermont:
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that while the Vermont constitution requires
that same-sex couples be afforded the same benefits of traditional marriage, the constitution
does not require the state to issue a same-sex marriage license); Virginia: no cases; Washington:
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (statutory prohibition of same-sex
marriage does not violate state constitution); Andersen v. King County and Castle v. State of
Washington (consolidated for decision), 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Super. 2004); Andersen v.
King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (upheld constitutionality of defense of marriage
statute); West Virginia: no cases; Wisconsin: no cases; Wyoming: no cases.
18. Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) reh 'g denied (2004),
review denied (Fla. 2005).
19. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
20. Id. at 135.
21. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973).
22. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971).
23. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971).
20081
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in law create a marriage contract and that the plaintiff and defendant
are not and have not ever been 'husband and wife' or parties to a
valid marriage.24
A Texas court refused to recognize the "marriage" of a man and a
transsexual born as a man who surgically and chemically altered his physical
characteristics to that of a woman.25 Rejecting the transsexual's claim to a
marriage license, the court noted that in "our system of government it is for the
legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should
govern the recognition of marriages involving transsexuals." 26 "[T]his court
has no authority to fashion a new law on transsexuals, or anything else. We
cannot make law when no law exists: we can only interpret the written word of
our sister branch of government, the legislature." 7 The court therefore held "as
a matter of law, that Christie Littleton is a male. As a male, Christie cannot be
married to another male. 28
An Ohio court similarly denied the issuance of a marriage license to a
transsexual. 29 Noting that the marriage license law prohibited parties from
misrepresenting any facts required for the license, the court observed the
following: "It is axiomatic that if a license is inadvertently issued where there
has been a material misrepresentation of factual information, such as sex,
marital status, or age, then such license would be void. 3°
A Washington court found that marriage was permissible only between one
man and one woman.3 1 The court held that the same-sex couple was "not being
denied entry into the marriage relationship because of their sex; rather, they are
being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of the recognized
definition of that relationship as one which may be entered into only by two
persons who are members of the opposite sex., 32 Refusing to allow same-sex
couples to marry is not based upon their same-sex status, but
24. Id. at 501.
25. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
26. Id. at 230.
27. Id.
28. Id. at231.
29. See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. 1987). The holding in Ladrach was
reaffirmed by another Ohio court in 2003. See In re Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL
23097095 (Ohio Ct. App.).
30. Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 831. The applicant was refused a marriage license after
advising the clerk that "she" had been married two previous times to females.
31. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
32. Id. at 1192.
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rather it is based upon the state's recognition that our society as a
whole views marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for
procreation and the rearing of children. This is true even though
married couples are not required to become parents and even though
some couples are incapable of becoming parents and even though
not all couples who produce children are married. These, however,
are exceptional situations. The fact remains that marriage exists as a
protected legal institution primarily because of societal values
associated with the propagation of the human race.33
Therefore, defining "marriage to exclude homosexual or any other same-sex
relationships is not to create an inherently suspect legislative classification..
Although some may contend that "other cultures may have fostered
differing definitions of marriage, marriage in this state, as elsewhere in the
nation, has been deemed a private relationship of a man and a woman (husband
and wife) which involves 'interests of basic importance to our society."'35
"[T]he state has exclusive dominion over the legal institution of marriage [and
the] societal values which are involved in this area must be left to the
examination of the legislature .... [Indeed, traditional] marriage as now
defined is deeply rooted in our society.,
36
B. The Federal Defense of Marriage Act Recognizes the States' Interest in
Traditional Male-Female Marriage
In response to the failed attempt in Hawaii to judicially recognize same-sex
marriage, Congress passed what is known as the Federal Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA).3 7 Congress designed the Federal DOMA to permit each state to
set its own marriage policy, giving each state the right to refuse full faith and
credit to any out-of-state same-sex union. Effective September 21, 1996, the
law the Federal DOMA was amended to read as follows:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
33. Id. at 1195.
34. Id. at 1196.
35. Id. at 1197 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)).
36. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1197.
37. See Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 255 (1998) [hereinafter Original
Understanding].
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treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or right or claim arising from such
relationship.38
"Congress was intended to have broad power to create statutes like DOMA
under the Effects Clause" of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 39 The Full Faith
and Credit Clause in Article IV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution,
states the following: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State; And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effects thereof."40
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Constitution gives the Congress
the power to determine the "effects" of an act, record, or judicial proceeding of
another state. During the Constitutional Convention the "effects clause"
became the subject of controversy. The issue was whether the Full Faith and
Credit Clause would include the power to govern the effects not only of state
court judgments, but also of the legislative acts of the states.4 ' Justice Joseph
Story noted in his commentary that the "effects" are "expressly subjected to the
legislative power.
'4 2
The First Congress enacted the Full Faith and Credit Act to "prescribe the
mode in which the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings in each State,
shall be authenticated so as to take effect in every other state.' 43 Today the Full
Faith and Credit Act remains essentially unchanged and states the following:
"Such acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
'
"
4
Pursuant to authority granted by the Constitution to determine the "effects"
of acts, records, or judicial proceedings in another state, Congress passed the
Federal DOMA.
Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its
own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges that right,
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
39. Original Understanding, supra note 37, at 392.
40. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
41. See Statement of William Samuel Johnson, September 3, 1787, in 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 488 (Max Farrand ed. 1911).
42. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 661
(1833) (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, eds. 1987).
43.. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
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because of the force given to a conflicting statute or another state by
the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon
some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of
the foreign state are superior to those of the forum. It follows that
not every statute of another state will override a conflicting statute
of the forum by virtue of the full faith and credit clause ....
One commentator stated that the historical evidence "makes it clear that the
first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause should not be interpreted to
contain broad choice of law commands to the states. 46 Professor Whitten
argues that "the evidence is compelling that Congress was intended to have
broad power to create statutes like DOMA under the Effects Clause" and the
historical evidence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause indicates that DOMA
may not even be necessary, but is certainly within Congress's authority.47 In
Baker v. General Motors Corp.,48 "the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the constitutionality as well as the continuing vitality of the public policy
doctrine and choice of law."49 Indeed, the Supreme Court stated that the "Full
Faith and Credit Clause does not compel 'a state to substitute the statutes of
other states for its own statutes dealing with the subject matter concerning
which it is competent to legislate."'
50
Professor Hogue, commenting on Georgia law, stated that "[h]omosexual
unions will likely be held violative of the state's public policy . .
Recognizing that a number of states have adopted statutes prohibiting the
recognition of same-sex unions, Professor Hogue noted that these "statutes will
control in states which have them. In instances in which a state lacks a statute,
the common law (through the public-policy exception) will continue to supply
45. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal., 294 U.S. 523, 547-48.
See also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (Full Faith and Credit Clause does
not compel one state to substitute statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with subject
matter within which it is competent to legislate); Jordan Herman, The Fusion of Gay Rights and
Feminism: Gender Identity and Marriage After Baehr v. Lewin, 56 OmIo STATE L.J. 985, 991
n.25 (1995) (observing that in family law questions the United States Supreme Court seems to
balance the forum state's public policy interests against the interests of comity).
46. Original Understanding, supra note 37, at 392.
47. Id.
48. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
49. L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Same-Sex
"Marriage": How Will States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?, 32 CREIGHToN L. REv. 29,
30(1998).
50. Baker, 522 U.S. at 232 (quotation and citations omitted).
51. Hogue, supra note 49, at 30.
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the appropriate rule. 52 The Supreme Court in Williams v. North Carolina,53
noted that the "necessary accommodation between the right of one State to
safeguard its interest in the family relation of its own people and the power of
another state to grant divorces [or recognize marriage] can be left to neither
State.
54
Professor Hogue correctly notes that in "states which have adopted [same-
sex] anti-recognition statutes," the state courts will lack jurisdiction to
adjudicate rights arising as a result of or in connection with out-of-state same-
sex unions.55 Professor Lynn Wardle, who testified before Congress during the
adoption of the Federal DOMA, stated the following:
There is no serious doubt that Congress has the power to enact
legislation defining the "effect" of one states' [sic] laws, records and
judgments in other states. Sentence two of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution (Article IV, § 1) explicitly provides that:
"The Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." The Congressional Research Service of the Library of
Congress has stated: Congress has the power under the clause to
decree the effect that the statutes of one State shall have in other
States." A host of scholarly authority for many decades concurs
with this assessment. 6
Congress has a "substantial interest" in "balancing the interests" of the several
states by preventing one state's policy from dictating what the legal policy of
other states will be.57 Even Professor Mark Strasser, an advocate of same-sex
marriage, conceded the following:
Both the First and Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws suggest
that a marriage which would be treated as void in the domicile at the
time of the marriage need not be recognized, notwithstanding its
being valid in the state of celebration. Section 132(d) of the
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws suggests that a "marriage
which is against the law of the state of domicile of either party,
52. Id. at 36-37.
53. 325 U.S. 226 (1945) ("Williams II").
54. Id. at 232.
55. Hogue, supra note 49, at 42-43.
56. Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex
Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 187, 223 (1998) (citations and emphasis
omitted).
57. See United States v. Edgebroad Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
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though the requirements of the law of the state of celebration have
been complied with, will be invalid everywhere" if it involves a
"marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicile makes
void even though celebrated in another state." The Second
Restatement suggests a similar policy, as a marriage need not be
recognized if "it violates the strong public policy of... [the] state
which had the most significant relationship to the spouses in the
marriage at the time of the marriage.
5 8
The Supreme Court has explained that "marriages not polygamous or
incestuous, or otherwise declared void by statute, will, if valid by the law of the
State where entered into, be recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction."' 9
Accordingly, one state does not have to recognize an out-of-state same-sex
union or same-sex marriage recognized by another jurisdiction if(1) the out-of-
state union is contrary to the state's public policy or (2) the out-of-state union is
prohibited by the domicile state's statute and the domicile state has the
jurisdiction to enact its own legislation on the matter.
The Federal DOMA evinces a strong nationwide policy of promoting
marriage between one man and one woman. The longstanding public policy
from the founding of this country to the present has restricted marriage to only
one man and one woman. The Federal DOMA protects state sovereignty with
respect to setting marriage policy by allowing states to refuse recognition to any
out-of-state same-sex union. The real question the courts must now address is
what constitutes a man and a woman for purposes of marriage? The
methodology used in answering this question must focus on objective, rather
than subjective criteria.
III. SEX FOR PURPOSES OF MARRIAGE MUST BE DETERMINED BY
OBJECTIVE BIOLOGICAL RATHER THAN SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL
CRITERIA
A. Sex Is An Immutable Characteristic Determined At The Time Of Birth
When "sex" was established as a suspect classification under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court anchored the class to the crucial similarity that
it shares with race and national origin: immutability and determination at birth.
In Frontiero v. Richardson,60 the Court explained:
58. Mark Strasser, DOMA and the Two Faces of Federalism, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 457,
464 (1998).
59. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934).
60. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular
sex because of their sex would seem to violate the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility .... 61
"Gender, like race, is a highly visible and immutable characteristic... ."
62
"Sex" is "the one acknowledged immutable difference between men and
women ...."63 If one could change sex like changing clothes, every law
designed to protect against sex discrimination becomes pointless. Sex, like
race, is and must be immutable and fixed at birth in the eyes of the law.
B. Sex Must Be Determined By Objective Criteria
As with race and national origin, the law recognizes that a person's sex is
immutable and therefore courts must determine sex by objective rather than
subjective criteria. Rene Descartes' famous saying, "I think, therefore I am,' 64
61. Id. at 686 (emphasis added). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 n. 2 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quotations emitted).
62. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (emphasis added).
63. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power, 435 U.S. 702, 727 (1978) (Burger, J.,
Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 330 (1993) (the "capacity to become pregnant is the inherited and
immutable characteristic that 'primarily differentiates the female from the male."' (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)); see also Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464,466,471
(1981) (upholding California statutory rape law and agreeing with "the immutable physiological
fact that it is the female exclusively who can become pregnant."); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351,
357, (1974) (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., dissenting) (sex, like alienage or national origin is
"immutable"); Frandsen v. County of Brevard, 800 So. 2d 757, 758 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001),
review denied, 828 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2002) ("Physical differences between men and women,
however, are enduring"). See also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (close relatives
"do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics"); City of Cleburne v.
Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,442 (1985) (mentally disabled are "immutably" different);
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (children of illegal aliens have no control over their
status, unlike their parents); Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (illegitimacy is like
race or national origin because the status is not within the control of the illegitimate person). See
also Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 349-40 (D.C. 1995) (rejecting Equal
Protection challenge to law prohibiting same-sex marriage, stating characteristic of suspect class
having "an immutable trait that is beyond a class member's control" is not present with same-
sex couples).
64. RENE DEscARTEs, A DISCOURSE ON METHOD, 24 (J.M. Dent ed., Orion Pub. Group
1999) (1637) ("Cogito ergo sum").
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 472 2007-2008
TRANSSEXUALISM AND THE BINARY DIVIDE
cannot mean that a person legally becomes who they think they are. The law
cannot condone a fill-in-the-blank marriage policy ("I think, therefore I am
[male/female]"). Marriage has long been defined as the "[l]egal union of one
man and one woman as husband and wife., 65 In the same way that Michael
Jackson remains African-American in spite of surgery or skin bleaching,
transsexuals cannot change their birth sex despite cosmetic surgery. Any union
other than the binary male and female model is not marriage. If someone can
merely think they are African-American, the law cannot permit such a person to
claim minority status. If sex is a "continuum" definable only by subjective
mental ruminations, then most of our laws (and certainly equal protection) will
have no meaning.66
1. The Laws of the Several States Do Not Recognize Sex-
Change Surgery to Alter Sex For The Purpose of Marriage-
The Majority Rule
The majority rule in America clearly holds that a transsexual may not marry
someone of the same birth sex. This rule is based on the historic international
rule that began in Great Britain.
i. Florida
The Florida Court of Appeal voided the "marriage" between a postoperative
female-to male transsexual and another female under the state's marriage laws
that recognize only the union of one man and one woman.67 The case involves
Margo Kantaras who was born female in Ohio. In 1986, Margo moved to
Texas and changed her name to "Michael" (hereafter "MK"), and in 1987
underwent SRS, which involved testosterone treatments, a total hysterectomy
and a double mastectomy. 68 In 1989, MK obtained a marriage license in
Florida and "married" another female by the name of Linda, who at the time
was aware of the SRS, and who also knew that MK still retained her female
vagina.69 After Linda became a Christian and informed MK that their
relationship was improper, MK filed for divorce and sought custody of Linda's
two children. Linda filed a counter-petition claiming that the "marriage" was
65. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (5th ed. 1979).
66. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 20
U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972 to the Equal Opportunity in
Education Act dealing with equal funding of female athletics).
67. Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. App. 2004) reh'g denied (2004), review
denied (Fla. 2005).
68. Id. at 155.
69. Id. at 155-57.
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void under Florida law.70 Acknowledging that Florida law explicitly limits
marriage to one man and one woman and bans same-sex marriage, the court
stated the following: "The controlling issue in this case is whether, as a matter
of law, the Florida statutes governing marriage authorize a postoperative
transsexual to marry in the reassigned sex. We conclude they do not.",
7 1
The Kantaras court stated that the common meaning of "male and female..
refer to immutable traits determined at birth., 72 The court deferred to the
legislature, stating:
Whether advances in medical science support a change in the
meaning commonly attributed to the terms male and female as they
are used in the Florida marriage statutes is a question that raises
issues of public policy that should be addressed by the legislature.
Thus, the question of whether a postoperative transsexual is
authorized to marry a member of their birth sex is a matter for the
Florida legislature and not the Florida courts to decide. Until the
Florida legislature recognizes sex-reassignment procedures and
amends the marriage statutes to clarify the marital rights of a
postoperative transsexual person, we must adhere to the common
meaning of the statutory terms and invalidate any marriage that is
not between persons of the opposite sex determined by their
biological sex at birth. Therefore, we hold that the marriage in this
case is void ab initio.73
ii. Kansas.
The Kansas Supreme Court found that a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual is not a woman within the meaning of the marriage statutes, and
therefore, such "marriage" is void.74 Joseph M. Gardiner, III, in the probate
proceeding of Marshall G. Gardiner, challenged the right of J'Noel Gardiner's
right to receive a spousal share of Marshall's estate on the grounds that the
marriage was fraudulent and void, because J'Noel remained a male and same-
sex marriage in Kansas was barred by statute.75 After reviewing domestic and
international case law,76 the court observed the following:
70. Id.
71. Id. at 161
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
75. See id. at 122-123.
76. The English case of Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33 (1970) and the Texas case of
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000),
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ii. Kansas
The Kansas Supreme Court found that a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual is not a woman within the meaning of the marriage statutes, and
therefore, such "marriage" is void.74 Joseph M. Gardiner, III, in the probate
proceeding of Marshall G. Gardiner, challenged J'Noel Gardiner's right to
receive a spousal share of Marshall's estate on the grounds that the marriage
was fraudulent and void, because J'Noel remained a male, and same-sex
marriage in Kansas was barred by statute.75 After reviewing domestic and
international case law,76 the court observed the following:
[T]he essential difference between the line of cases, including
Corbett and Littleton, that would invalidate the Gardiner marriage
and the line of cases, including MT. and In re Kevin, that would
validate it is that the former treats a person's sex as a matter of law
and the latter treats a person's sex as a matter of fact.77
The court therefore stated, "We view the issue in this appeal to be one of law
and not fact. The resolution of this issue involves the interpretation of [Kansas
Statutes]. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this court has
unlimited appellate review. 78 The "fundamental rule of statutory construction
is that the intent of the legislature governs., 79 The court continued:
The words "sex," "male," and "female" are words in common usage
and understood by the general population. Black's Law Dictionary,
1375 (6th ed. 1999) defines "sex" as "[t]he sum of the peculiarities
of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female
organism; the character of being male or female." Webster's New
20th Century Dictionary (2nd ed. 1970) states the initial definition
of sex as "either of the two divisions of organisms distinguished as
male or female; males or females (especially men or women)
74. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
75. See id. at 122-123.
76. The English case of Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33 (1970) and the Texas case of
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000),
refused to recognize the right of a transsexual to marry a person whose sex was that of the
transsexual's birth sex. The case of M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) cert.
denied, 364 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1976) and In re Kevin, Fani. C.A. 1074 (File No. SY8136 Of.
1999, Family Court of Australia at Sydney), ruled that a transsexual may marry a person of the
transsexual's birth sex.
77. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 132-33.
78. Id. at 135.
79. Id.
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collectively." "Male" is defined as "designating or of the sex that
fertilizes the ovum and begets offspring; opposed to female."
"Female" is defined as "designating or of the sex that produces ova
and bears offspring; opposed to male." According to Black's Law
Dictionary, a marriage is "the legal status, condition, or relation of
one man and one woman united in law for life, or until divorce, for
the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally
incumbent on those whose association is founded on the distinction
of sex."80
After discussing the common understanding of the terms sex, male and female,
the court continued:
The words "sex," "male," and "female," in everyday understanding
do not encompass transsexuals. The plain, ordinary meaning of
"persons of the opposite sex" contemplates a biological man and a
biological woman and not persons who are experiencing gender
dysphoria. A female-to-male post-operative transsexual does not fit
the definition of a female. The male organs have been removed, but
the ability to "produce ova and bear offspring" does not and never
did exist. There is no womb, cervix, or ovaries, nor is there any
change in his chromosomes. As the Littleton court noted, the
transsexual still "inhabits... a male body in all aspects other than
what the physicians have supplied.",
8 1
The court rejected the argument that the absence of the word "transsexual"
from the same-sex marriage statute made the statute vague. "We view the
legislative silence to indicate that transsexuals are not included. If the
legislature intended to include transsexuals, it could have been a simple matter
to have done so."'82 The court cited to Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. ,83 which
reversed a federal district court that held that sex included not only
chromosomes, but also psychological self-perception. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals found that "to include transsexuals within the reach of Title
VII far exceeds mere statutory interpretation." 84 Finding Ulane "well reasoned
and logical," the court held that the legislature clearly viewed "opposite sex" in
the narrow traditional sense.
80. Id. (citation omitted).
81. Id. (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 136.
83. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
84. Id. at 1086.
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We cannot ignore what the legislature has declared to be the public
policy of this state. Our responsibility is to interpret [the statute]
and not to rewrite it .... If the legislature wishes to change public
policy, it is free to do so; we are not. To conclude that J'Noel is of
the opposite sex of Marshall would require that we rewrite [the
Kansas Defense of Marriage Act]. 5
Thus, "J'Noel remains a transsexual, and a male for purposes of marriage under
[the Kansas DOMA] .... [T]he validity of J'Noel's marriage to Marshall is a
question of public policy to be addressed by the legislature and not by this
court."
86
iii. Ohio
Ohio does not allow a transsexual to obtain a marriage license to marry a
person of the same gender as their birth sex. In the case of In re Nash, 7
Pamela Nash was born female in Massachusetts. Nash later married a man and
subsequently divorced, after which she relocated to Ohio.88 In Ohio, Nash
changed her name to "Jacob Benjamin Nash., 89 Nash then applied to change
her Massachusetts birth certificate to reflect a change in sex designation from
female to male, and the request was granted, so that the certificate included
both the new name and male sex designation.90 Shortly thereafter, Nash
obtained an Ohio driver's license and applied for an Ohio marriage license.
During a search of the name, the clerk learned of Nash's prior name change,
and Nash was informed that the license would not be issued. In rejecting the
transsexual marriage, the Nash court noted that Ohio recognizes marriage only
between members of the opposite sex.91 The court noted that "any change to
Ohio's public policy concerning transsexuals and marriage or expanding the
definition of male and female ... must come from the legislature. 92 The court
concluded that "a marriage between a post-operative female-to-male transsexual
and a biological female is void as against public policy.
93
85. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136-37 (Kan. 2002).
86. Id. at 137.
87. 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App.).
88. Id. at *1.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at "5.
92. Id. at *9.
93. Id.
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In the case of In re Ladrach,94 another Ohio court found that a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual was not permitted to marry a male. The case began
with the filing of a petition for name change by Edward Franklin, who
presented himself in female dress and explained that he intended to undergo a
"transsexual surgery" later in the year.95 The applicant asked the court to
change his name to Elaine Francis Ladrach, and since the statute allows name
changes so long as there is no fraudulent intent to deceive creditors or others,
the court granted the request.96 After the surgery, the applicant came to the
courthouse with his "fiancd," acknowledging on the application that he had
been previously married twice to females.97 The clerk refused to issue the
license and the applicant filed for declaratory relief, stating that he "considered
himself a female and that he had undergone a 'medical surgical procedure that
resulted in the removal of the penis and testicles and the creation of a
vagina.' 98 The court noted that it is "generally accepted that a person's sex is
determined at birth by an anatomical examination by the birth attendant."99 The
court then concluded "that there is no authority in Ohio for the issuance of a
marriage license to consummate a marriage between a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual person and a male person."'' ° The court observed:
The determination of a person's sex in regard to his birth certificate
and marital status are legal issues and, therefore, the court must look
to the statutes. This court is charged with the responsibility of
interpreting the statutes of this state and judicial interpretations of
these statutes. Since the case at bar is apparently one of first
impression in Ohio, it is this court's opinion that the legislature
should change the statutes, if it is to be the public policy of the state
of Ohio to issue marriage licenses to post-operative transsexuals.l0 1
94. 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987).
95. Id. at 829.
96. Id. See O8mo REV. CODE ANN. § 2717.01 (1986).
97. In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 829.
98. Id. at 830.
99. Id. at 832.
100. Id.
101. Id. Two states recently enacted legislation that specifically prohibits changing sex or
gender on birth certificates. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-250; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d).
A Florida Attorney General opinion states that "mandatory legislation is required in order to
permit the State Registrar to amend birth certificates issued to individuals who have undergone
sex-reassignment surgery," that it is "irrelevant" whether an individual has allegedly undergone
sex-reassignment surgery after birth, and concludes that the Florida State Registrar "is not
authorized or empowered to amend birth certificates issued to individuals who have undergone
478 [Vol. 2:459
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The court also noted that there was "no laboratory documentation that the
applicant had other than male chromosomes" and therefore, the application "to
obtain a marriage license as a female person is denied."' 0 2 Although this case
was published, the trial court never referenced this decision.
iv. Texas
In Littleton v. Prange,10 3 the Texas court found that a ceremonial "marriage"
between a man and a transsexual born as a man, who was later surgically and
chemically altered to have the physical characteristics of a woman, was not
valid and was, thus, void. The court queried: "[C]an a physician change the
gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a person's gender
immutably fixed by a Creator at birth?"'1 4 The court began the discussion by
observing the following:
In our system of government it is for the legislature, should it choose
to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition
of marriages involving transsexuals .... But this court has no
authority to fashion a new law on transsexuals, or anything else. We
sex reassignment surgery." Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 076-213. See also FLA. STAT. § 382.016. A
number of states through statutory enactments allow the birth certificate to be changed to reflect
a different sex than is listed on the certificate. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-9A-19; ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-326; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-307; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 103430; COLO.
REv. STAT. § 25-2-115; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-42; D.C. CODE § 7-217; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-
10-23; HAW. REv. STAT. § 338-17-7; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 535/17; IND. CODE § 16-37-2-10;
IOWA CODE § 144.23; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 213.121; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:62; MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE § 4-214; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46 § 13(e); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2831;
MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-57-21; Mo. REV. STAT. § 193.215; NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-604.1; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.12; N.M. STAT. § 24-14-25(D); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-118(4); OR.
REV. STAT. § 432.235; UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-2-11; VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-269; Wis. STAT. §
69.15(4)(b). While not specified in the statute, several additional states allow for sex changes
on the birth certificate through administrative procedures. See, e.g., KAN. ADMiN. REGS. 28-17-
20; 10 Me. Gov't Reg. 146, ch.2; NEv. ADMiN. CODE § 440.130; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.130.
The statutes of several states are vague and therefore it is unclear how these states handle a
request to change sex on the birth certificate. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 3131; MINN.
STAT. § 144.218(4); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-15-204; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 126:23-a (Repealed);
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 61 and 24; R.C.N.Y. HEALTH CODE § 207.01; N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-
02.1-25; OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-321; 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 450.603; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-3-21;
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-63-150; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-24-51; TEx. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE §
191-028; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5075; W. VA. CODE § 16-5-24; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-
424.
102. Id.
103. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
104. Id. at 224.
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cannot make law when no law exists: we can only interpret the
written word of our sister branch of government, the legislature.' 05
The Texas court found that the matter presented a "pure question of law and
must be decided by this court."'' 0 6 The court then observed that Christie was
created and born a male and her original Texas birth certificate clearly so stated.
The court acknowledged that Christie amended the original birth certificate to
change the sex and name during the pendency of the suit, but then pointed out
that the trial court's role in considering the petition is merely a ministerial one,
which involves no fact-finding. 10 7 "At the time of the birth, Christie was a
male, both anatomically and genetically. The facts contained in the original
birth certificate were true and accurate, and the words contained in the amended
certificate are not binding on this court."' 08 "There are some things we cannot
will into being. Theyjust are."' 1 9 The court therefore held "as a matter of law,
that Christie Littleton is a male. As a male, Christie cannot be married to
another male. Her marriage to Jonathan was invalid . .10
v. New York
New York will not recognize a transsexual "marriage.""' In this case, the
plaintiff was a man who sought a declaration to determine the validity of a
"marriage" to another male "who appeared to be a female."' 12 The two met at a
house of prostitution where, although they spent a short time together, the
plaintiff did not see the defendant unclothed or have any sexual relations. 1 13
When the plaintiff, a non-commissioned officer in the United States Army, was
transferred to Fort Hood, Texas, the defendant followed him.' 14 A few days
later, the two took part in a marriage ceremony and they both returned to the
plaintiff's apartment.' "5 Being intoxicated, the plaintiff fell asleep. He woke
up early in the morning and reached for the defendant, and upon touching him,
discovered that the defendant had male sexual organs.'1 6 He immediately left
the bed, "got drunk some more" and the next day, the defendant informed the
105. Id. at 230.
106. Id.
107. Id. at231.
108. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1971).
112. Id. at499.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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plaintiff that he intended to undergo an operation to have the male organs
removed."17 The parties never had any sexual relationship.1 8  Later, the
plaintiff was transferred overseas and returned the next year." 19 In the interim,
the defendant sent numerous letters to the plaintiff along with medical bills for
hospital and surgical expenses.120 Although it is unclear, these expenses were
presumably paid for by the plaintiff.' 2' When the plaintiff returned from
overseas to San Francisco, he arranged for the defendant's release from jail on a
prostitution charge, and the two later traveled to New York for the purpose of
arranging a legal divorce or separation.' 22 The defendant told the plaintiff on
this trip that he had completed a sex surgery and was now a "woman."'
2 3
The court found that the defendant was not a woman and that "mere removal
of the male organs would not, in and of itself, change a person into a true
female."' 124 The court observed that the "law makes no provision for a
'marriage' between persons of the same sex.125 Marriage is and always has
been a contract between a man and a woman.' 26 "Accordingly, the court
declares that the so-called marriage ceremony in which the plaintiff and the
defendant took part... did not in fact or in law create a marriage contract and
that the plaintiff and defendant are not and have not ever been 'husband and
wife' or parties to a valid marriage.'
1 27
128In B. v. B., the court reconfirmed the holding in Anonymous, finding that
marriage is between one man and one woman. The court quoted a surgeon who
had performed more than 700 sex-reassignment surgeries: "I don't change men
into women. I transform male genitals into genitals that have a female aspect.
All the rest is in the patient's mind.' 2 9 Finding that the female who underwent
sex reassignment surgery to be "male" "does not possess a normal penis, and in
fact does not have a penis" and in the same way that surgery cannot provide a
117. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
118. Id. at 500.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 501.
128. 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1974).
129. Id. at 717 (citation omitted).
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man "with something resembling a normal female sexual organ, transplanting
ovaries or a womb," the court voided the marriage.
130
vi. Federal
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,1
3 1
found that a male-to-female transsexual is not covered by Title VII. In Ulane, a
male pilot working for Eastern Airlines underwent sex-reassignment surgery,
revised his birth certificate and the FAA certified him as a "female.' '132 Ulane's
own physician, however, explained "that the operation would not create a
biological female in the sense that Ulane would 'have a uterus and ovaries and
be able to bear babies."" 33  Holding that Title VII "does not protect
transsexuals," the court rejected the district judge who wrote that sex was more
than chromosomes and should include psychological and self-perception
components. 134 To the contrary, the appellate court stated that its responsibility
was "to interpret this congressional legislation and determine what Congress
intended when it decided to outlaw discrimination based on sex.' 3 5
Beginning with the "maxim of statutory construction that, unless otherwise
defined, words should be given their ordinary, common meaning," the court
found that Title VII banned discrimination based on "sex," which "implies that
it is unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women and
against men because they are men. 136 A "prohibition against discrimination
based on an individual's sex is not synonymous with a prohibition against
discrimination based on an individual's sexual identity disorder or discontent
with the sex into which they were born.' 37  "In our view, to include
transsexuals within the reach of Title VII far exceeds mere statutory
interpretation. Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind when it passed the
130. Id. In Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1966) and in Hartin
v. Director of the Bureau of Records and Statistics, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), the
courts upheld the Board of Health's rules that refuse to allow sex to be changed on birth
certificates. One court noted the Board of Health's findings that "surgery for the transsexual is
an experimental form of psychotherapy by which mutilating surgery is conducted on a person
with the intent of setting his mind at ease, and that nonetheless, does not change the body cells
governing sexuality. In the words of one of the medical members of the Board, 'I would think
that it would be unsound, if, in fact, there were encouragement to the broader use of this means
of resolving a person's unhappy mental state."' Hartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
131. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
132. Id. at 1083.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1084.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1085.
137. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
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Civil Rights Act. .,,18 To hold that Title VII protects transsexuals "would
take us out of the realm of interpreting and reviewing into the realm of
legislating.',
139
vii. Foreign Jurisdictions
In spite of this brief overview of international law, the admonition of
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas is apropos when he states that courts
"should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.' 140 "[I]t is
American conceptions of decency that are dispositive .... It is irrelevant
how other countries interpret their laws. What is to prevent one court from
relying on the marriage laws of Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan to support bigamy
or to exclude women from power and reduce them to property? One indictment
against the King of Great Britain in the Declaration of Independence stated:
"He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our
constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their
pretended Legislation."' 142 We must not forget that important part of American
138. Id. at 1086.
139. Id. Other federal courts have similarly found that Title VII does not protect
transsexuals. See Mario v. P& C Food Mkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 767 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing
Ulane and Sommers and stating it is unclear whether transsexuals are protected Title VII);
Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that transsexuals are not a
protected class, but noting that this legal question may need to be reevaluated); Sommers v.
Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566
F.2d 659, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1977); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. CIV.A. 00-3114,2002 WL
31098541, at *6 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002); Mims v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 706, 714
(E.D. Texas 2000); Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., No. 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996); Dobre v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK), 850 F. Supp.
284, 286-87 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Doe v. Alexander, 510 F. Supp. 900, 904 (D. Minn. 1981); Terry
v. EEOC, No. Civ.A.80-C-408, 1980 WL 334, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31, 638, at *19, 732-33
(E.D. Wis. 1980); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Md. 1977); Voyles v.
Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affd mem., 570 F. Supp.
354 (9th Cir. 1978); Grossman v. Bd. of Educ., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1196, 1199 (D.
N.J. 1975), affd mem., 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976). But see,
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200-02 (9th Cir. 2000) (erroneously stating that the loose
use of the terms "sex" and "gender" in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,240 (1989),
overrules Holloway and similar cases that recognized that Congress intended "sex" to
encompass only the plain meaning of male and female, which is also indicated by several bills
introduced later attempting to extend the scope of Title VII discrimination).
140. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
141. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n. 1 (1989) (plurality) (emphasis in original).
142. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration of
Independence is one of the four organic laws of the United States of America. The other three
are the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, the NoRTHWEST ORDINANCE, and the UNITED STATES
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history, namely the American Revolution. If we learn anything at all from the
international cases, we should only note with a nod that the country which most
parallels our common law system is Great Britain, and the historical
interpretation by these courts have concluded that sex must be determined
biologically and that a transsexual may not marry a person whose sex is the
same as the transsexual's sex at birth.
The first reported transsexual case in the world is Corbett v. Corbett.
43
Corbett involved a person whose sex at birth was male, but who later
underwent an operation to remove his testicles and most of the scrotum, along
with an incision to create an artificial "vagina." Arthur Corbett met this
transsexual who presented himself as a woman and the two married. After the
marriage, Mr. Corbett learned that his "wife" was actually a man. He filed for
divorce, asking the court to declare the "marriage" null and void. After
listening to medical testimony, the court noted that there were several possible
factors in determining a person's sex, which included (1) chromosomes; (2)
gonads (the presence or absence of testes or ovaries); (3) genitalia (including
internal and external sex organs); (4) psychological; and (5) hormonal factors or
secondary sexual characteristics (such as the distribution of hair and physique).
Discussing the inherent problems with hormonal and psychological factors, the
court observed the following:
Since marriage is essentially a relationship between man and
woman, the validity of the marriage in this case depends, in my
judgment, on whether the respondent is or is not a woman....
Having regard to this essentially heterosexual character of the
relationship which is called marriage, the criteria must, in my
judgment, be biological, for even the most extreme degree of
transsexualism in a male or the most severe hormonal imbalance
which can exist in a person with male chromosomes, male gonads
and male genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is naturally
capable of performing the essential role of a woman in marriage. In
other words, the law should adopt, in the first place, the first three of
the doctors' criteria, i.e., the chromosomal, gonadal and genital
tests, and if all three are congruent, determine the sex for the
purpose of marriage accordingly, and ignore any operative
intervention .... My conclusion, therefore, is that the respondent is
not a woman for the purposes of marriage but is a biological male
CoNsTrrUTON. All four are reproduced in full at the front of every copy of the UNITED STATES
CODE.).
143. 2 All. E.R. 33, 2 W.L.R. 1306 (Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Div. 1970).
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and has been so since birth. It follows that the so-called marriage of
10th September 1963 is void. 44
The court in Corbett recognized any other decision incorporating hormonal or
biological factors would be fraught with insurmountable difficulties. The court
pondered the following questions:
If a law were to recognize the [sex surgery] "assignment" of the
respondent to the female sex, the question which would have to be
answered is, what was the respondent's sex immediately before the
operation? If the answer is that it depends on 'assignment' then, if
the decision at that time was female, the respondent would be a
female with male sex organs and no female ones. If the assignment
to the female sex is made after the operation, then the operation has
changed the sex. From this it would follow that if a 50-year-old
male transsexual, married and the father of children, underwent the
operation, he would then have to be regarded in law as a female, and
capable of 'marrying' a man! The results would be nothing if not
bizarre .... Marriage is a relationship which depends on sex and
not on gender. 145
The holding in Corbett was reexamined and confirmed in England in the
case of Bellinger v. Bellinger. Until recently, the European Court of Human
Rights had routinely upheld England's refusal to recognize the right of
transsexuals to marry.
146
In W. v. W., the court in South Africa followed the decision in Corbett. The
court found a transsexual marriage to be invalid and stated that the "evidence
does not show that the operation converted her into a female. What it did was
to artificially supply her with certain of the attributes of a woman, namely,
breasts and a vagina-like cavity .... Imitation cannot be equated with actual
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Rees v. United Kingdom (1986) 9 E.H.R.R. 56; Cossey v. United Kingdom (1990)
13 E.H.R.R. 622 and Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom (1998) 27 E.H.R.R. 163. The
European court reversed itself in Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18, in which
the court held that the United Kingdom was in breach of Articles 8 and 12 of the European
Convention on Human Rights referred to by some courts as the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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transformation."'147 The court noted that in order to recognize the right of a
transsexual to marry, "intervention of the legislature would be necessary.' 48
Several Canadian courts have also followed the reasoning in Corbett. In B.
v. A. ,'19 a Canadian court found that a female-to-male transsexual who had a
twenty-year relationship with a female was not a "spouse" within the meaning
of the Family Law Act.'50 The court found that the transsexual who had
undergone a hysterectomy, mastectomy and hormonal treatments, but had not
yet received an artificially constructed penis, was not a "male" and would
"revert" back to her female self once the hormone treatments ceased.' 51
In C. (L.) v. C. (C.), '2 an Ontario court concluded that the marriage between a
female and a female-to-male post-operative transsexual was void ab initio. The
court found that the transsexual had not received an artificially created penis
and thus had not changed her sex. 53 In M v. M (A), 54 another Canadian court
considered a case involving two people who lived together for thirteen years,
first as common-law and then as married persons. 55 After they separated, the
female spouse began to live as a man and started hormonal treatment, although
no surgery had yet been performed. 5 6 The husband received a Decree of
Nullity, even though the attempted sex change occurred after the marriage
147. Lim Ying v Hiok Kian Ming Eric [1992] 1 SLR 184, citing W. v. W. (1976) (2)
S.A.L.R. 308.
148. Id. An English court of appeal in Regina v. Tan & Others (1983) Q.B. 1053, followed
Corbett in the context of a criminal sex offense, stating that the Corbett decision should apply
not only for marriage but also for a charge brought under the Sexual Offenses Act. In the case
of In re C. & D. (1979) 28 A.L.R.524, an Australian court considered the case of a
hermaphrodite who was born with one testicle, one ovary, a uterus, breasts and a penis. This
person also had a rudimentary vagina. In an attempt to "correct" his anatomical anomalies, this
person underwent a series of surgical operations, in the course of which his female attributes
were removed. He then married a female for a period of some five years, but he was not able to
consummate the marriage. The wife sought a Decree of Nullity. The court found that in
Australia, marriage is "the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others" and was
satisfied that on the evidence, the "husband was neither man nor woman but was a combination
of both, and a marriage in the true sense of the word as within the definition referred to above
could not have taken place and did not exist." The marriage was therefore void.
149. B. v. A., (1990), 29 R.F.L. (3d) 258 (Ont. S.C. T.D.).
150. See also Lori Johnson, The Legal Status ofPost-Operative Transsexuals, 2 HEALTH L.J.
159, 166 (1994).
151. See B. v. A., 29 R.F.L. (3d) at 6.
152. (1992), 10 O.R. (3d) 254 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
153. Id. at 5.
154. (1984) 42 R.F.L. (2d) 55 (P.E.I. S.C.).
155. Id. at 9.
156. Id. at 10.
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dissolved. The court found that the wife had latent transsexual characteristics
which prohibited her from being capable of being married to a male.1"
The Singapore courts have also followed the decision in Corbett. In Ying v.
Eric,158 the court considered a female who underwent sex-reassignment surgery
to become male, including a phalloplasty which involved the construction of an
artificial "penis." The court noted that "since the respondent's penis was
artificial, erection for sexual intercourse was not possible." The court found
that "one's sex is fixed at the moment of conception" and that chromosomes
should be the primary relevant factor in determining sex. The Singapore court
considered relevant law and concluded as follows:
It is desirable in the interests of certainty and consistency for the
word "man" under the Charter to be given the ordinary meaning that
is in contradistinction to woman. A person biologically a female
with an artificial penis, after surgery and psychologically a male,
must, for purposes of contracting a monogamous marriage of one
man and one woman, under the Charter be regarded as a "woman."
The court therefore declared the marriage to be a nullity and then concluded:
"A person who has undergone a sex-change operation cannot be regarded as
belonging to the sex for which reassignment surgery was undertaken for
purposes of a monogamous marriage under the Charter."
2. Subjective Psychological Definition-The Minority rule
The minority rule, especially in America, includes a subjective psychological
component to the definition of "sex" or "gender." There is only one reported
case in America that has followed this path, along with several international
decisions.15 9 There are no such rulings internationally among common-law
countries.
i. New Jersey
In MT. v. J. T. ' 160 the court found that a female-to-male post-operative
transsexual was permitted to marry a person of the sex of the transsexual at
birth. The essence of the court's decision was as follows:
157. See also Johnson, supra note 150, at 167.
158. (1992) 1 S.L.R. 184.
159. The Kansas Court of Appeals also embraced this minority rule. See In re Estate of
Gardiner, 22 P. 3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). This decision, however, was reversed by the
Kansas Supreme Court. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P3d 120 (Kan. 2002). The Kansas
Supreme Court adopted the majority rule and thus defined sex biologically rather than
psychologically.
160. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
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If such sex reassignment surgery is successful and the postoperative
transsexual is, by virtue of medical treatment, thereby possessed of
the full capacity to function sexually as a male or female, as the case
may be, we perceive no legal barrier, cognizable social taboo, or
reason grounded in public policy to prevent the person's
identification at least for purposes of marriage to the sex finally
indicated. 161
The court found that the transsexual had physiologically become a "female"
and should be "considered a member of the female sex for marital purposes."'
' 62
Then the court made the astonishing statement that such "recognition will
promote the individual's quest for inner peace and personal happiness, while in
no way disserving any societal interest, principle or public order or precept of
morality., 163 There is certainly more at stake than a person's "inner peace and
personal happiness;" rather, there are many societal interests at stake. Every
court of last resort in America has rejected the reasoning in the New Jersey
decision.
ii. Foreign Jurisdictions
An Australian Family Court found that a female with typical XX
chromosomes, female genitalia and gonads, but who surgically removed these
female organs, should be considered a "man" for purposes of Australia's
marriage law.I 64 Instead of focusing on birth to determine sex, the court
focused instead on the time of marriage. 165 Although acknowledging that a
transsexual is to be distinguished from someone with Klinefelter's Syndrome,
hermaphroditism, and Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, the court nevertheless
considered that surgical removal of female gonads and genitalia was sufficient
to transform a "female" into a "male."' 166 However, this decision on appeal was
set aside by the full court of the Federal Family Court on February 21, 2003.167
In Secretary, Department of Social Security v. S.R.A., 68 a federal court in
Sydney found that for purposes of the Social Security Act, the words "woman"
161. Id. at210-211.
162. Id. at211.
163. Id.
164. In re Kevin (2001) 165 F.L.R. 404.
165. Id. at 475.
166. Id. at 454,475.
167. In re Kevin, Appeal No. EA/97/2001(unreported). See also Bellinger v. Bellinger
(2003) U.K.H.L. 21 at 16.
168. (1993) 43 F.C.R. 299.
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and "female" included a post-operative male-to-female transsexual. 169 The
court noted that a person who was only "psychologically" female but who had
not undergone sex surgery would not be considered a person of the desired
sex. 170
In Attorney-General v. Family Court at Otahuhu,17 1 a New Zealand court
found that for purposes of the New Zealand Marriage Act of 1955, where a
person had undergone surgical and medical procedures, such a person could
marry another, even though that other person was of the same birth sex as the
transsexual. The court noted that the Marriage Act of 1955 did not "refer to
man and woman or husband and wife" as a specific union, but the court
nevertheless considered marriage to be the union of one man and one woman.
In addressing where to draw the line, the court noted that in order
for a transsexual to be eligible to marry in the sex of assignment, the
end of the continuum must have been reached and reconstructive
surgery done.... [T]here must be as complete a transformation as is
possible before that person can qualify as a person of his or her
chosen sex for the purpose of marriage.
172
The court noted that a "preoperative transsexual" who dresses and behaves in
the assigned sex may be accepted in that sex for employment and social
purposes, such as a driver's license, but it would "not be appropriate for such a
person whose genitals do not correspond with the sex of assignment to be able
to many in that sex.' 73 The court realized that its reasoning was on somewhat
shaky ground when it artificially drew the line for marriage by requiring the
person to actually undergo sex surgery. Once a psychological component is
considered, it is incongruent to force a person to undergo surgery, yet this court
drew the line with a surgical scalpel.1
74
169. Id. at 304.
170. Other Australian courts have disagreed with one another. See In re C. & D. (1979) 28
A.L.R. 524 (finding that sex reassignment surgery does not result in the acquisition of all the
biological characteristics of the other sex, and therefore the marriage was void).
171. 1994NZFLRLEXIS 51
172. Id. at 37.
173. Id. at 43.
174. If a psychological component is considered important in determining a person's sex,
then one cannot easily argue that surgery is necessary to complete the so-called sex
transformation. If a psychological component is accepted, then a person may argue for sex-
change status on the basis of subjective psychological thoughts alone, stating that it is unfair to
require expensive surgical intervention. Consider the person who may suffer from a heart
condition and is unable to undergo the sex-change surgery. Will a person who suffers from a
disability and who cannot undergo sex-change surgery be told he or she cannot change into the
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Although the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France,
upheld on three separate occasions Great Britain's right to deny a marriage
license to a transsexual, the court has now receded from that position and found
England's position to be in contravention to Articles eight (right to respect for
private life) and twelve (right to marry) of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
175
Ever since the first case in America to affirm transsexual marriage in 1976,
every other court of last resort has refused to accept that a person's sex can be
changed for purposes of marriage. Sex must be determined by objective rather
than subjective standards.
IV. SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY DOES NOT CHANGE A PERSON'S SEX
Hormone treatment and plastic surgery do not transform a male to female
nor a female to male. If that were the case, there will be many surprised
females who have undergone surgical mastectomies or hysterectomies. To
assume plastic surgery changes sex is an insult to these women. Since surgery
cannot change sex, and "thoughts" are too amorphous to be objective, biology
must be the determinant.
A. Chromosomes Determine Sex
The X and Y chromosomes are the biological drivers that determine sex. A
chromosome is one of the threadlike "packages" of genes and other DNA in the
nucleus of a cell. Humans have twenty-three pairs of chromosomes for a total
of forty-six; forty-four autosomes and two sex chromosomes. Each parent
contributes one chromosome to each pair, so offspring get half of their
chromosomes from their mother and half from their father. 76 The egg carries
the X chromosome while the sperm carries either an X or a y.177
Unless the Y chromosome is present and properly transcribed, the child will
develop into a female. In extremely rare cases, genetic mutations or defects
desired sex, when another person who is more physically and financially capable can do so?
Including a psychological component to determine sex is fraught with innumerable problems.
175. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18. See also Rees v. United
Kingdom (1986) 9 E.H.R.R. 56 (finding that England's denial of the right of a transsexual to
marry did not violate Articles 8 or 12); Cossey v. United Kingdom (1990) 13 E.H.R.R. 622
(same) and Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom (1998) 27 E.H.R.R. 163 (same).
176. See, e.g., National Human Genome Research Institute: Talking Glossary, GENOME.GOV,
available at http://www.genome.gov/glossary.cfin?key=;chromosome (last visited Sept. 6,2008).
177. See, e.g., Chromosomes X and Y and Sex Determination, BIOLOGY-ONLINE.ORG,
available at http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/SexDetermination (last visited Sept. 6,
2008).
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Some transsexual advocates claim their bodies do not match their mind's
"gender identification," and thus have attempted to compare themselves with
intersexuals, who suffer from a biological (rather than psychological) ambiguity
with regard to their sex.18' A clinical definition of intersex, however, only
includes conditions in which the phenotype, or the visible characteristics, are
not classifiable as either male or female (for example, the presence of both male
and female genitalia), or chromosomal sex (e.g., XX or XY) is not consistent
with phenotypic sex. 182 There is nothing in the definition of intersex that refers
to psychology. On the other hand, transsexuals are born with chromosomal and
phenotypic consistency. The "inconsistency" is not biological or physiological,
but psychological, referred to as gender dysphoria or gender identity disorder
(hereinafter "GID"). 8 3 The condition of intersex precludes a diagnosis of
transsexual or any other GID.'84
Intersex conditions are not as frequent as some transsexual literature may
suggest. While some cite a study by Anne Fausto-Sterling that purported to
determine the occurrence of intersex in the U.S. population at around 1.7
percent, a sound critique of that study found that true intersexuals only account
for 0.018 percent of the population. 185
B. Biological Definition Of Sex By Chromosome Testing Is Both Possible and
Realistic.
Biology can and must be the only measure of sex. The International
Olympic Committee used sex chromosome testing from 1966-2000 to verify the
181. Some have even gone so far as to attempt to define them under the same umbrella.
"Transgenderist" is a term used to describe both transsexuals and intersexuals. A transgendered
person is one whose psychological sexual identity is opposite from the biological and physical
sex that he/she appeared to be at birth." According to the source, transvestites (cross-dressers)
are also included in the definition of"transgender." Shana Brown, Sex Changes and "Opposite-
Sex " Marriage: Applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause to Compel Interstate Recognition of
Transgendered Persons 'Amended Legal Sexfor Marital Purposes, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1113,
1119 (2001).
182. See Leonard Sax, How Common is Intersex? A Response to Anne Fausto-Sterling, 39 J.
OF SEX RESEARCH 174, 176 (2002). The term "intersex" is usually reserved for individuals of
intermediate sexual differentiation, who are most often sterile. See WILLIAM S. KLUG &
MICHAEL R. CUMMINGS, ESSENTIALS OF GENETICS 155-70 (3d ed. 1999).
183. See AM. PsYCwATRIc ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR MENTAL
DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR, §302.85 (2000) (hereafter "DSM-IV-TR").
184. Id. ("The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex condition.").
185. See Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough,
33(22) THE SCIENCES 20-24 (May/April 1993); ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY:
GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY (2000). Leonard Sax has shown the
flaws in Fausto-Sterling's conclusions. See Sax, supra note 182, at 174.
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sex of female athletes.' 86 The most basic test that is used is the Buccal smear
test, which involves staining a cell sample and evaluating it for the presence or
absence of the Barr body.187 The Barr body is caused by the inactivation of one
of the two X chromosomes in genetic female (XX) cells. Genetic males (XY)
do not show this Barr body since they only have one X chromosome, which
stays active. 8 8 One problem that the Olympics Committee had with the Buccal
smear was its inability to properly detect intersexuality. For instance, Maria
Patino, a female hurdler from Spain, was wrongly excluded from competition
because she failed the Buccal smear test. She had an intersex condition known
as Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome. 18 9 While she had XY chromosomes, her
body lacked the necessary receptor for the male hormone, so she developed as a
woman. Because the male hormone had no impact on her body, she did not
186. Myron Genel, Gender Verification No More?, available at http://www.womensspor
tsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/disc/article.html?record=879 (last visited Sept. 6, 2008),
reprinted from 5 MEDSCAPE WOMEN'S HEALTH 3 (2000). At the 1992 winter games in
Albertville, the IOC replaced sex chromatin with DNA testing methods to detect Y
chromosomes, particularly the SRY sex-determining locus on the Y chromosome. See A. Serrat
and A. Garcia de Herreros, Determination of Genetic Sex by PCR Amplification of Y-
chromosome-specific Sequences, 341 LANCET 1593-94 (1993). DNA testing has been
temporarily discontinued, in part, because the clothing used in athletic competition, as well as
the requirement that urine samples be given in the presence of an observer, are sufficient
methods to determine sex. See L. Elsas, R. Hayes and K. Muralidharan, Gender Verification in
the Centennial Olympic Games, 86 GA. J. MED. Ass'N, 50-54 (1997).
187. See Douglas R. Stewart, Medical Encyclopedia: Buccal Smear, available at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003414.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2008). A
Barr body, named for Canadian anatomist Murray Llewellyn Barr (1908-1995), is a densely
staining mass that represents an inactivated X chromosome. It is a heterochromatic body found
in the nuclei of normal females, but is absent from the nuclei of normal males. See Barr Body,
available at http://www.biochem.northwestem.edu/holmgren/Glossary/Definitions/Def-
B/Barr body.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
188. Canadian Academy of Sports Medicine, Position Statement: Sex Testing (Gender
Verification) in Sport, available at http://www.casm-acms.org/forms/statements//GendereVeri
fEng.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Canadian Academy Position Statement].
189. Other intersex conditions and sex chromosome aneuploidies that result in an incorrect
diagnosis of sex using the Buccal smear test are Klinefelter's Syndrome (a male with XXY
chromosomes that would be diagnosed as a woman), 46XX males (males that are XX but have
the male determining portion of the Y chromosome inscribed on one of their X chromosomes),
Gonadal Dysgenesis (women who are XY but do not have testes), and Turner's Syndrome
(women who have an XO chromosome makeup. Since they only have one X chromosome, the
Buccal smear test would show them to be male.). See Alison S. Carlson, When is a Woman not
a Woman?, WOMEN SPORT FrINESs, 24-29 (March 1991).
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have an unfair advantage over the other women in the competition, and was
properly considered a female.190
With advances in genetic technology, the testis determining factor, or the
gene that results in the development of a male, was isolated and determined to
be the SRY gene, which in genetic males (XY), is located on the Y
chromosome.191 Karyotyping 92 is systematic while polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) analysis of the SRY gene provides information about the presence of a Y
chromosome within one day. 193 Since the PCR test is "far simpler and less
expensive than previous techniques for duplicating DNA [it has] democratized
genetic research, putting it within reach of all biologists, even those with no
training in molecular biology."'
94
190. Canadian Academy Position Statement, supra note 188. Unlike Androgen Insensitivity
Syndrome, Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia is an intersex condition that would pass the Buccal
smear test for femininity, but would confer an unfair advantage upon the athlete. The athlete
would have XX chromosomes, but the adrenal glands produce excess androgen, resulting in
masculine characteristics which would inevitably enhance strength and muscle mass. Id.
Hermaphrodites and pseudohermaphrodites may or may not pass the Buccal smear test,
depending on what sex was assigned to them and whether it corresponds with their
chromosomal sex. Id.
191. XY females nearly always lack the SRY gene. In rare cases it is present but mutated.
XX males have it transcribed onto one of their X chromosomes. Studies have shown that when
the gene is added to XX mice, the sex reverses from female to male. Corinne Cotinot, et al.,
Molecular Genetics of Sex Determination, 20 SEMINARS IN REPROD. MED. 157 (2002) available
at www.medscape.com/viewarticle/444686 (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
192. Karyotyping is a photomicrograph of chromosomes arranged according to a standard
classification. Karyotyping, http://karyotyping.tripod.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
193. C. Sultan et al., Ambiguous Genitalia in the Newborn, SEMINARS IN REPRODUCTIVE
MEDICINE, Aug. 2002, available at MEDLINE (FirstSearch version), NLM No. 100909394.
The SRY gene has a fundamental role in sex determination and is believed to be
the switch that initiates the testis development. SRY is regulated by genes
upstream in the sex determination pathway and exerts its function by interaction
with genes downstream in the pathway. Any deregulation of the sex pathway
leads to abnormal sex differentiation and, in some cases, to complete sex reversal.
Translocations of SRY are known to be associated with 80% of cases of 46, XX
maleness. Mutations in the SRY, SOX9, SF 1, and WTI genes are associated with
46, XY gonadal dysgenesis, as are deletions of chromosome 2q, 9p, and 1Oq, and
duplication of chromosome Xp21.
Kyriakie Sarafoglou & Harry Ostrer, Familial Sex Reversal: A Review, available at
http://jcem.endojournals.org/cgi/content/full/85/2/483 (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
194. Tabitha M. Powledge, The Polymerase Chain Reaction, available at
http://opa.faseb.org/pdf/The%20Polymerase%20Chain%20Reaction.pdf (last visited Sept. 6,
2008); see also Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): Replicating Millions of Copies From a
Single Gene, available at http://waynesword.palomar.edu/lmexer3b.htm (last visited Sept. 6,
2008). The inventor of PCR, Karry B. Mullis, was awarded the Noble Prize in 1993. See
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Chromosome testing remains highly important and relevant. Genetic testing
for sex chromosome aneuploidies and intersex conditions is simple and routine
in the diagnosis of these conditions. About 900 genetic tests are now being
offered by diagnostic laboratories. 1
95
Chromosome analysis, or karyotyping, involves looking directly at the
chromosomes to determine if there are any abnormalities like a chromosomal
rearrangement; and for more subtle genetic disorders, the actual DNA sequence
of a particular gene is analyzed. 196 In the rare cases where there happens to be
dysgenesis between observed sexual characteristics and the results of the
Buccal smear test, specialized genetic testing can be utilized. A PCR test can
be done to detect the SRY gene. Through this process, a person's sex can be
reliably determined, even if the initial Buccal smear does not correctly diagnose
a rare condition.
197
The argument that sex must include a psychological component is specious.
The few cases which do not on first blush neatly fit into one category do not
undermine the male-female paradigm any more than birth defects undermine
normal human physiology. The logic behind the argument for a "gender
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), available at http://www.genome.gov/l0000207 (last visited
Sept. 6, 2008); The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1993, available at http://www.nobelprize.org/
nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1993/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2008.)
195. See Francis S. Collins, A Brief Primer on Genetic Testing: World Economic Forum,
January 24, 2003, available at http://www.genome.gov/10506784 (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
See also Denise Casey, What Can the New Gene Tests Tell Us?, available at
http://www.oml.gov/TechResources/HumanGenome/publicat/judges/j udge.html (last visited
Sept. 6, 2008).
196. For example, Klinefelter's Syndrome is diagnosed with peripheral blood karyotyping to
detect an extra X chromosome. See The Medical Algorithms Project, Criteriafor the Diagnosis
of Klinefelter's Syndrome, available at http://www.medal.org/visitor/www/Active/ch43/ch43
.19/ch43.19.01.aspx (last visited Sept. 6,2008). Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome is diagnosed
by testing for mutations in the AR gene. See Leonard Pinsky, Mark A. Trifiro, GeneReviews:
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, available at http://www.geneclinics.org/profiles/androgen/
details.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2008). 21 -hydroxylase deficiency (the most common cause of
congenital adrenal hyperplasia) is diagnosed by testing the CYP2 IA2 gene for mutations or
deletions. See Maria I. New, Saroj Nimkarn, GeneReviews: 21-Hydroxylase Deficient
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/bookshelf/br.fcgi
?book=-gene&part--cah (last visited Sept. 6, 2008). Francis S. Collins, A BriefPrimer on
Genetic Testing, available at http://www.genome.gov/10506784 (last visited May 30, 2008)
(Dr. Collins is the Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute); see also
http://www.genetests.org (for a list of specific types of tests) (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
197. Given the small proportion of intersex in the population (.0018%), and the fact that
many of these conditions still yield a recognizable phenotype (see Appendix A), the resulting
amount of people requiring additional testing is almost unmeasurable. See Appendix B for a
diagram of the testing process.
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spectrum" stems from a desire to create a norm from an anomaly. As already
noted, transsexuals are not intersex and intersexuals are not transsexuals. An
intersex condition is an ambiguity between the chromosomes and the gonads or
genitalia. Transsexuals have harmony between the chromosomes, gonads and
genitalia, but claim a conflict between the mind and the body.
98
The transsexual movement is reminiscent of cultural trends in the 1960s to
"normalize" schizophrenia by claiming schizophrenics were victims of
"psychiatric oppression." Because of these efforts, thousands of mentally ill
people were released from hospitals to the streets, often becoming homeless or
incarcerated. 199 Anne Fausto-Sterling, the author of the study erroneously
claiming intersex conditions affect 1.7 percent of the population, argued that all
possible combinations of sexual anatomy should be considered normal, and that
classifications of normal and abnormal sexual anatomy are "mere social
conventions, prejudices which can and should be set aside by an enlightened
intelligentsia., 200  One advocate wrote that "transsexualism [is] a socially
constructed problem created by the medical establishment .... ,,20 Harry
Benjamin opined that "[i]nstead of treating the patient, might it not be wiser
and more sensible to treat society . . . ?,202 The currently fashionable
movement toward "tolerance" and freedom from "oppressive" social constraints
becomes absurd when it ignores reality. Binary sex is more than just a
paradigm-it is a medical reality, and it must remain a legal reality in order to
preserve the integrity of the law.
20 3
1. Surgical and Chemical Modalities Designed to Alter Sexual
Appearance Is Experimental And Controversial Medical Treatment
Plastic surgery and hormone therapy may alter a person's physical
characteristics but cannot alter the person's sex. A woman who had a
hysterectomy and mastectomy is a woman. A woman who thinks she is a man
is a woman. A woman who has had a hysterectomy and mastectomy and
therefore thinks she is a man, still remains a woman.
198. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 183, at § 302.9. "Individuals with Gender Identity
Disorder have normal genitalia (in contrast to the ambiguous genitalia or hypogonadism found
in physical intersex conditions)." Id. at 579.
199. See Paul McHugh, Psychiatric Misadventures, THE BEST AMERICAN ESSAYS 1993, at
188-91(Joseph Epstein and Robert Atwan, eds., 1993); Sax, supra note 182, at 177.
200. Sax, supra note 182, at 177.
201. Id.
202. Leah Cahan Schaefer & Connie Christine Wheeler, Harry Benjamin's First Ten Cases
(1938-1953): A Clinical Historical Note, 24 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 83 (1995).
203. Id.
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Radical surgical procedures on male-to-female transsexuals include removal
of the penis and scrotum, bilateral orchiectomy (removal of the testicles),
vaginoplasty (creation of artificial vagina), estrogen hormone injections, and
perhaps a tracheal shave (reducing the tracheal cartilage commonly called the
Adam's apple). Female-to-male surgery includes a radical mastectomy, a total
hysterectomy (removal of the uterus and ovaries), testosterone injections, and in
rare cases, an artificial construction of a penis (phalloplasty) or enlargement of
the clitoris (metaidoioplasty). Phalloplasty merely creates an imitation penis
that lacks sensitivity and will not become erect without a stiffening device.2 °4
Studies indicate that many who undergo a phalloplasty are unhappy with their
resulting imitation organ.2 °5 When a patient chooses not to undergo a
phalloplasty, another surgical option is a metaidoioplasty. This technique
allows the clitoris to extend further out, and it shapes the enlarged clitoris to
look more like a small penis.20 6 The length of the metaidoioplasty-enlarged
clitoris would still be insufficient for intercourse.
20 7
Hormonal treatment of the female-to-male and male-to-female transsexuals
can cause a number of dangerous side effects.2 " Some research shows that
female-to-male transsexuals who have been treated with hormones for four to
five years, but have not had a hysterectomy, have developed "intrauterine
complications." 20 9 Hormone treatment, commonly used by transsexual patients,
substantially increases risk of cardiovascular disease and liver complications.2'0
Long-term, high-dose androgen therapy is associated with impaired vascular
reactivity in genetic females, independent of the effects of androgens on
204. See JANICE RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE 160-
61 (Teachers College Press 1994) (1979).
205. See James Barrett, Psychological and Social Function Before andAfter Phalloplasty, 2
INT'L J. TRANSGENDERISM 1 (1998),available at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtc0301.htm
(last visited Sept. 6, 2008). The study notes that as few as 39% having phalloplasty are happy
with the result, leaving 61% dissatisfied.
206. See Carlo Trombetta, et al., Total Sex-Reassignment Surgery in Female-to-Male
Transsexuals: a One-Stage Technique, 90 BJU INT'L 754, 756 (2002).
207. Id.
208. Walter Futterweit, Endocrine Therapy of Transsexualism andPotential Complications
of Long-term Treatment, 27 ARCHIVE OF SExUAL BEHAVIOR 209 (1998). Some complications
include water and sodium retention, increased erythopoiesis, decreased carbohydrate tolerance,
decreased serum high-density lipoprotein (HDL) cholesterol, liver enzyme abnormalities,
obesity, emotional or psychiatric problems, and sleep apnea.
209. Shadow Morton et al., Notes on Gender Role Transition, FTM 101 - The Invisible
Transsexuals (last revised 1997) available at http://www.avitale.com/FTM 10 l.htm (last visited
Sept. 6, 2008) (ranging from fibroid cysts, to endometriosis, to fibrous scar tissue that formed
around reproductive organs).
210. Id.
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lipoprotein levels or vessel size.21 1 Androgen treatment in a male-to-female
transsexual can cause recurrent myocardial infarction. 2
"The number of deaths in male-to-female transsexuals was five times the
number expected, due to increased numbers of suicide and death of unknown
cause." 213 Based on a study of 303 male-to-female transsexuals undergoing
estrogen hormone treatment, pulmonary embolism, cerebral thrombosis,
myocardial infarction, prostatic metaplasia, and breast cancer were commonside
effects of the hormones.214
"Sex-reassignment" surgery is an experimental and likely unethical treatment
because it dramatically increases health risks while showing no objective
evidence of curing gender identity disorder. One study revealed major
complications can occur during, immediately and some time after sex-
215reassignment surgery. One of the most common and gruesome risks of a
male-to-female SRS is a rectovaginal fistula which also includes a very high
risk of infection. 1 6  In addition, minor complications are frequent. 17  The
female-to-male transsexual faces some unique problems after a double
mastectomy or mastopexy if they are taking testosterone hormones.21 8
211. See Robyn J. McCredie, et al., Vascular Reactivity is Impaired in Genetic Females
Taking High-Dose Androgens, 32 J. AM. COL. OF CARDIOLOGY 1331 (1998).
212. See Josd Biller, et al., Ischemic Cerebrovascular Disease and Hormone Therapy for
Infertility and Transsexualism, 45 NEUROLOGY 1611, 1612 (1995); H. Asscheman, et al.,
Mortality and Morbidity in Transsexual Patients with Cross-Gender Hormone Treatment, 38
METABOLISM 869 (1989).
213. See Asscheman, supra note 212.
214. Id.
215. S. Krege, et al., Male-to-female Transsexualism: A Technique, Results and Long-term
Follow-up in 66 Patients, 88 BJU INTERNATIONAL 396 (2001). Fourteen percent had major
complications during, immediately, and some time after, surgery. This includes "severe wound
infections in six, a rectal lesion in three, necrosis of the glands in three and necrosis of the distal
urethra in one."
216. Sarah, Notes on Gender Transition: Living With a Rectovaginal Fistula (2000)
available at http://www.avitale.com/RectovaginalFistula.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2008). A
rectovaginal fistula is "an opening between the rectum and the newly-created vagina ....
Symptoms include intrusion of intestinal fluids, gases and feces into the vagina, and often
intestinal distress."
217. Susanne Krege, et al., Male-to-female Transsexualism: A Technique, Results andLong-
term Follow-up in 66patients, 88 BJU INTERNATIONAL 396-402 (2001). Thirty-six percent had
meatal stenosis, i.e. the narrowing of the urethra which can cause difficulty urinating.
218. Shadow Morton, et al., Notes on Gender Role Transition, FTM 101 - The Invisible
Transsexuals (revised 1997) available at http://www.avitale.com/FTMIOI.htm (last visited
Sept. 6, 2006). "With testosterone comes body hair. The chest hair that grows in around the
sutures and incisions can, at the very least, be incredibly annoying, and in the extreme can
become ingrown and even cause infection."
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Therefore, because of the dangers surrounding the surgery, the validity of the
treatment should be questioned and certainly the law should not encourage it by
granting the patient a new legal sex status.
Furthermore, some patients have refuted the success of the surgical
procedures. According to a long-term follow-up of male-to-female transsexuals
that underwent SRS, thirty percent considered retrospectively the SRS a
mistake.2 19 In particular, there was a case concerning a male-to-female that
lived as a female for approximately two and a half years, but the day before his
SRS, the hospital stopped performing the procedure.220 Mickey was born male,
but throughout his early life he felt uncomfortable with his sex and longed to be
221a woman. As a result, when Mickey was twenty-two, he applied for SRS.
The doctors evaluated Mickey and approved his sex-reassignment surgery.222
Mickey began to take hormones and dress and act as a woman, and lived as a
female for two and a half years. 23 Researchers report that, in fact, he was a
very convincing female.224 However, a day before he was to enter the hospital
to have his genitals removed, the hospital changed its policy and refused to
perform further sex-reassignment surgeries. 225 Disappointed, Mickey continued
to live as a female. Through a series of events and therapy, however, his desire
to become a woman subsided until it finally disappeared.226 Mickey fell in love
with a woman and repudiated his desire to have his genitals removed and to live
as the opposite sex. Researchers report that he now leads a happier and more
stable life than he did when living as a woman. 227 Tragically, researchers also
tell stories of individuals who have the same recovery only after sex-
reassignment surgery has taken place.228
219. See Gurmar Lindemalm, et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of "Sex Change" in 13 Male-to-
Female Transsexuals, 15 ARCHIVEs OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 187, 199-201 (1986).
220. See Elsie R. Shore, The Former Transsexual: A Case Study, 13 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR, 277, (1984).
221. Id. at278.
222. Id. at 279.
223. Id. at 278-80,
224. Id. at 278, 282.
225. Id. at 280.
226. Shore, supra note 220, at 282.
227. Id. at 281-82.
228. See e.g., John Money & George Wolff, Sex reassignment: Male to Female to Male, 2
ARcHIVEs OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 245 (1973); J. Randell, Indications for Sex Reassignment
Surgery, 1 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 153 (1971). Dr. Robert Spitzer, who once opposed
reparative therapy (therapy with a goal to change a person's "sexual orientation), now
acknowledges that through such therapy "some gay men and lesbians are able to... change the
core features of sexual orientation." Robert L. Spitzer, Can Some Gay Men and Lesbians
Change Their Sexual Orientation? 200 Participants Reporting a Change from Homosexual to
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In addition to the negative subjective data from patients, there is a lack of
evidence showing that SRS grants the recipient an objective advantage in social
rehabilitation.229 Instead, there have been findings that point to the possibility
of psychosocial intervention as an alternative to surgery in the treatment of
transsexuals. 230 There are cases of adults with GID that persuasively display
how gender dysphoria can remit "over the years with or without treatment and
in response to various life events and comorbid psychopathology. ' 23' The law
should not grant a new legal sex status based on a mental condition which is
subject to change or a surgical procedure that the patient may later regret.
The American Psychiatric Association made substantial changes to the
diagnostic classification of GID in 1994.232 "These include[d] collapsing the
three diagnoses of gender identity disorder of childhood, transsexualism, and
gender identity disorder of adolescence or adulthood, nontranssexual type, that
were in the DSM-III-R into one overarching diagnosis, gender identity disorder
.... ,233 Therefore, transsexualism is a subsection of GID. However, unlike
the DSM-III-R, the diagnosis of GID cannot be given to persons with physical
Heterosexual Orientation, 32 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 403, 415 (2003). See also
ELAINE V. SIEGEL, FEMALE HOMOSEXUALITY: CHOICE WITHOUT VOLmON (1988) (reporting that
more than half of the twelve woman who were referred to her for counseling made complete
transitions from homosexual to heterosexual).
229. See Meyer, et al., supra note 3. One follow-up study found that "adoption of the new
gender role coincides with the hormonal reassignment and therefore is long before the surgical
gender reassignment." Friedemann Pf' fflin, et al., Sex Reassignment - Thirty Years of
International Follow-up Studies After Sex Reassignment Surgery: A Comprehensive Review,
1961-1991 (translated from German into American English by Roberta B. Jacobson and AIf B.
Meier) available at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/pfaefflin/1000.htm (last visited Sept. 6,
2008) (IJT Electronic Books).
230. David H. Barlow, et al., Gender Identity Change in Transsexuals, Follow-up and
Replications, 36 ARCHIMVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1001, 1002-07(1979). Conservatively diagnosed
transsexuals received psychosocial intervention that proved to be successful in aligning the
individual's gender identity with the natural sex of the patient.
231. Isaac Marks, et al., Adult Gender Identity Disorder Can Remit, 41 COMPREHENSIVE
PSYCHIATRY 273 (2000) ("A dramatic cure of apparent transsexualism, by less than 3 hours of
exorcism over two sessions, was documented and carefully measured from 7 months before to 2
years after the exorcism." Furthermore, there are additional individual cases where gender
dysphoria appeared with other mental illness and while the patient was treated (often with
medicine) for the latter mental illness, gender dysphoria subsided or was completely cured.
"Adult GID reportedly remitted for up to 10 years in response to sexual relationships and other
events in five cases evaluated by the second author (R.G.).").
232. See Susan J. Bradley, et al., Gender Identity Disorder: A Review of the Past 10 Years,
36 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 872, 873 (1997).
233. Id.
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intersex conditions. 234  The DSM-IV-TR makes a distinction between
individuals born with physical ambiguity (intersex), and one who is conflicted
mentally.2 35 The law should make a distinction as well. If the law grants a new
"sex" status for those who have been diagnosed with GID and who undergo
SRS, the law undoubtedly will be required to grant a new sex status for all
individuals diagnosed with GID, even without SRS.236
There are as many opinions concerning the treatment of GID as there are
psychiatrists and psychologists. 237 The lack of uniformity among the field may
be due to the rarity of the diagnosis.238 One study concluded that a variety of
interventions involving the parent and the child lowered cross-gender
identification.239  There are three approaches concerning child/parent
intervention: behavioral, eclectic, and analytic. 240 Literature concerning the
treatment of adolescents is rare, however, supportive therapy is the general
approach.241 The political movement of the transsexual community has had a
profound effect on the field of counseling by causing some extreme counselors
to believe that this mental illness should be encouraged. 42
Many psychiatrists oppose treating adolescence GID with irreversible
measures or even hormone administration too quickly because it may be a
mistake.243 Some psychiatrists speculate a "rapid agreement for sex
reassignment would signal that the therapist (who should maintain a neutral
position) supports the patient's desire for a sex change., 244 Expressing even
more concern, Dr. Paul Mc Hugh, Chairman of the Psychiatry Department at
John's Hopkins, criticized SRS as "radical, irreversible surgeries. 245
234. Id. See also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 183, at § 302.9.
235. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 183, at § 302.9.
236. If transsexualism is later declassified as a mental illness, like some are urging for
pedophilia, then sex merely becomes a fleeting transitional thought solely dependent on
personal whim. Equal protection then becomes a tangled web of meaningless prose.
237. See Bradley, et al., supra note 232, at 878-79.
238. Id. at 878.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 878-79.
242. Lynne Carroll, et al., Counseling Transgendered, Transsexual, and Gender-Variant, 80
J. COUNSELING & DEVELOP. 131 (2002) (advocating that the counselor listen, empathize, assume
a "not knowing stance," provide a "safe zone" where "gender diversity is not only accepted but
celebrated') (emphasis added).
243. Bernd Meyenburg, Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescence: Outcomes of
Psychotherapy, 34 ADOLESCENCE 11, 11-13 (1999).
244. Id.
245. JOHN COLAPiNO, As NATURE MADE HIM (2001).
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The source of GID is undetermined and therefore, any "treatment"
administered to a GID patient is experimental, leaving some psychologists to
follow an "instinctual hypothesis. ' '246 For example, Dr. Pickstone-Taylor
proposes that the "sole cause of GID is 'instinctual' and that the pervasive
cross-gender behavior of children with GID simply reflects their 'true
predilections or interests." 247 In contrast, Drs. Bradley and Zucker adhere to
the premise that the origin of GID is "multifactorial. ' '248 Those who follow the
latter model generally determine that one must look beyond biology to observe
factors such as "the role of temperament, parental reinforcement of cross-
gender behavior during the sensitive period of gender identity formation, family
dynamics, parental psychopathology, peer relationships, and the multiple
meanings that might underlie the child's fantasy of becoming a member of the
opposite sex.,,249 Although the exact source of GID is unknown, a prospective
study concluded that individuals with a non-homosexual preference, combined
with psychopathology and dissatisfaction with secondary sex characteristics,
were more likely to function poorer postoperatively and express more
discontentment about the outcome or result SRS had on their lives.250 This may
indicate that homosexuality is an indicator of a better postoperative outcome.
Thus, there are many unanswered questions. The law should not make an
anomaly the norm by giving legal marriage status to transsexuals.
2. There Are Many Mental Disorders Which Are Either Permanent or
Where Surgery to Conform The Mind To The Body is Unethical.
According to the DSM-IV-TR, the diagnostic criteria for GID include a
strong persistent cross-gender identification that is manifested by persistent
discomfort with the birth sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role
of that sex, "and clinical significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning. ''251 There are various
mental disorders associated with GID as coexisting disorders or as associated
disorders.252 Children diagnosed with GID may also have, as coexisting mental
disorders, Separation Anxiety Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and
246. Simon D. Pickstone-Taylor, Children with Gender Nonconformity, 42 J. AM. ACAD. OF
CHILD AND ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 266 (2003).
247. Id. at 267.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See YOLANDA L.S. SMITH, EF AL., SEX REASSIGNMENT: PREDICTORS AND OUTCOMES OF
TREATMENT FOR TRANSSExuALs 85, 105-06 (2002).
251. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 183, at § 302.9.
252. Id.
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symptoms of depression.253 Adolescents with GID are especially at risk for
depression and suicidal ideation.254 Adults with GID may have anxiety and
depressive symptoms. 255  Males with GID may also have a history of
Transvestite Fetishism, other paraphilias, and associated Personality
256Disorders. In addition, there are significant social, personal, and
occupational issues that may result from surgical sex changes, and the patient
may require psychotherapy or counseling. 257 Major self-mutilation, including
eye enucleation and amputation of limbs or genitals, is also usually associated
258with severe gender identity disturbances or with psychotic states.
Patients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder will typically
manifest self-mutilation beginning in adolescence and may continue to manifest
self-mutilation for decades.259 Self-mutilation and the act of "letting of blood"
becomes a quick method of relieving anxiety or anger.2 60 The mere fact that a
behavior will relieve anxiety or psychological distress, however, is insufficient
to justify the behavior when it involves mutilation. Similarly, SRS is a type of
bodily mutilation that is not justified merely because some contend it will
relieve psychological distress. 261 Psychological distress is not unique to GID; it
is a characteristic of a mental disorder, which is defined in the DSM-IV-TR as
"a clinically important collection of symptoms (these can be behavioral or
psychological) that causes an individual distress, disability, or the increased risk
of suffering pain, disability, death, or the loss of freedom., 262 Dr. Tabin, of the
National Committee for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality, noted the
danger of using the prevention of significant psychological distress as a
justification for stress-reducing behavior by pointing out that suicide attempts
would then have to be considered normal when desired by the participants.263
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 183, at § 302.9.
258. Tero J. Taiminen, Contagion ofDeliberate Self-Harm AmongAdolescent lnpatients, 37
J. Am. AcAD. OF CRLD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 211 (1998).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. "Some males with Gender Identity Disorder resort to self-treatment with hormones and
may very rarely perform their own castration or penectomy." DSM-IV-TR, supra note 183, at
§302.9.
262. Richard Irons & Jennifer P. Schneider, Differential Diagnosis of Addictive Sexual
Disorders Using the DSM-IV, 3 SEXuAL ADDICTION & COMPULSivITY 7 (1996).
263. See Linda Nicolosi, American Psychiatric Association Symposium Debates Whether
Pedophilia, Gender-Identity Disorder, Sexual Sadism Should Remain Mental Illnesses
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There are many types of disorders of self-mutilation in which a significant
level of cognitive dissonance exists between bodily perception and reality.
Theories regarding the appropriate therapy differ. Whether it is amputating a
limb or burning oneself, the proposed manner of treatment for such disorders
varies widely depending on the etiology. GID is a mental disorder, and as such,
GID is analogous to other self-mutilating disorders. Cognitive dissonance
between mind and body is insufficient to find SRS as the only solution.
Self-mutilation is defined as an "act that often . . . alleviates pathological
symptoms [such as] a perplexing feeling of numbness, strangeness, and
unreality in regard to one's body, thoughts, and emotions as well as to persons
and objects in the environment." 264  Among the different types of self-
mutilation is genital mutilation.265 SRS is analogous to genital mutilation.266
Psychological pain is a common symptom of self-mutilation disorders, in
which individuals report that their actions help relieve psychological pain.267
Some claim that self-injury is a means of promoting a sense of well-being and
control.268 Self-mutilation disorders are often related to life factors and clinical
correlates such as childhood sexual abuse and subsequent Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder and life conditions such as the loss of a parent, childhood illness,
depression, physical abuse, parental alcoholism, or parental marital violence.269
Studies suggest that there is also a strong correlation between sexual abuse and
GID.
270
Treatment for self-mutilating disorders includes learning to manage self-
injurious impulses and psychoanalysis. 271 Specifically, self-destructive acts can
be understood as resulting from and symbolizing certain intrapsychic phantasies
involving wishes, fears, and compromises, in which psychoanalysis provides
the optimum vehicle for the modification of the "internal self and object
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RESEARCH AND THERAPY FOR HOMOsExuALITY, available at
http://www.narth.com/docs/symposium.htm (last visited Sept. 6,2008) [hereinafter NARTH].
264. Robert T. Waska, Self-mutilation, Substance Abuse, and the Psychoanalytic Approach:
Four Cases, 52 AM. J. OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 18 (1998) (emphasis added).
265. Victoria E. White, et al., College Students and Self-Injury: Intervention Strategies for
Counselors, 5 J. OF COLLEGE COUNSELING 105, 106 (2002).
266. Sarah, supra note 216.
267. White, supra note 265, at 107.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 106-07.
270. Bradley, et al., supra note 232, at 878; Meyenburg, supra note 241; Max Sugar, A
Clinical Approach to Childhood Gender Identity Disorder, 49 AM. J. OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 260
(1995).
271. Bradley, et al., supra note 232, at 878.
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representations. 272 GID is in essence an intrapsychic phantasy that perceives
the self as a member of the opposite sex. Psychotherapy is often effective in
addressing cognitive dissonance between mind and body.273
Eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa and bulimia are characterized by
the co-occurrence of pathological thoughts and emotions concerning
appearance, eating, and food, leading to alterations in body composition and
functioning that are the direct result of these symptoms. 274  Similar to
disturbances in body image, GID is a disturbance in gender image that often
leads to alterations in body composition and appearance. 275  Proposed
treatments for anorexia include acute weight restoration and re-feeding as well
as individual, family, and group therapy.276 Treatments for bulimia consist
mainly of cognitive-behavioral approaches, as such treatments have been found
effective.277 While both GID and eating disorders are mental disorders in
which there is a discrepancy between one's perceived and actual physical body,
acceptable treatments for eating disorders consist of changing mental constructs
through cognitive therapy, or changing behavior through therapy.2 78 Treatment
does not consist of validating the skewed body image, no matter how much the
patient may truly perceive that mental image to be reality.279 In the same way,
proper treatment for GID should focus on treating the patient's mind in order to
develop a healthy self-concept of body through cognitive therapy, rather than
through radical surgical mutilation.
Paraphilias are a type of sexual disorder characterized by recurrent, intense
sexual urges or behaviors that are considered unusual or deviant by society.2 80
Such urges or behaviors also cause clinically significant distress or impairment
in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.28' Likewise,
GID is also a type of sexual disorder that can be described as a recurring sexual
behavior, or a mindset, that causes clinically significant distress or
272. Waska, supra note 264, at 19.
273. Id.
274. Hans Steiner & James Lock, Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa in Children and
Adolescents: A Review of the Past 10 Years, 37 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND ADOLESC.
PSYCHATRY 352 (1998).
275. Taiminen, supra note 258, at 211.
276. Steiner & Lock, supra note 274, at 353.
277. Id. at 356.
278. Id. at 357.
279. Id.
280. Irons & Schneider, supra note 262, at 10.
281. Id.
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282impairment. Therefore, doctors should treat GID as any other paraphilia by
cognitive therapy and not mutilation.
Another type of sexual disorder is sadomasochism, which is characterized by
a relation of dominance and submission, infliction of pain that is experienced as
pleasurable by both partners, deliberate humiliation of the other party,
fetishistic elements, and one or more ritualistic activities.283 In some instances,
sadomasochism is paraphiliac when it is the only way for an individual to get
sexually aroused and satisfied.284 Treatment for sadomasochism includes
traditional psychoanalysis and behavior therapy techniques.285 Sadomasochism
is treated as a "mental disorder," characterized by distress, harm, or functional
impairment.286 Even though in some instances sadomasochism maybe the only
means of sexual arousal in an individual, thereby apt to cause a significant
amount of psychological distress if the behavior is not permitted, treatment
entails modifying the mind and behavior instead of condoning such activity for
the sake of easing the mind and decreasing psychological distress.
Pedophilia is a sexual disorder in which adults justify having sex with
children by displacing blame onto the infants.287 Treatment for pedophilia
includes negative conditioning, cognitive-behavioral therapy, medication, and
hormones to decrease the sex drive.288 In short, treatment focuses on changing
the sexual urges. Pedophilia, in its description as a "perversion," implies that
there is a "moral normative standard" from which the perversion deviates. The
question therefore remains how one defmes the normative conception of
perversion. Deeply rooted in American culture and public policy is the norm of
male and female, man and woman.
As a matter of public policy, in order to maintain a consistent jurisprudence,
the determination of sex must be independent from the psychological musings.
An individual's sex preference can manifest itself at different times in life:
282. Id.
283. N. Kenneth Sandnabba & Pekka Santtila, Sexual Behavior and Social Adaptation
Among Sadomasochistically-Orientated Males, 36 J. OF SEX RESEARCH 273 (1999).
284. Id. at 274.
285. See N. Breslow, Sources of Confusion in the Study and Treatment ofSadomasochism, 4
J. Soc. BEHAVIOR AND PERSONALITY 263 (1989); see also Sexual Sadism, http://www.psychnet-
uk.com/dsmiv/sexualsadismdisorder.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
286. Id.
287. Ben Spiecker and Jan Steutel, Paedophilia, Sexual Desire and Perversity, 26 J. OF
MORAL EDUCATION 332 (1997).
288. See Pedophilia, Psychology Today, available at http://www.psychologytoday.con
conditions/pedophilia.htm1 (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
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childhood, adolescence, or adulthood.289 If a person's sex were determined by
psychological inclinations, sex would become variable, changing throughout
the course of life. The diagnosis of GID is itself a changing diagnosis since
some children diagnosed with GID may later in life display few, if any,
symptoms. 290 In fact, only a very small number of children with GID continue
to have symptoms that meet the criteria for GID in later adolescence or
adulthood.291 Most children with GID display less overt cross-gender behaviors
as time passes, as parental intervention increases, or as peer response
increases.292
Treatment for children diagnosed with GID focuses on secondary problems
such as depression, anxiety, and self-esteem.293 Therapeutic modalities for
children with GID are for the most part diametrically different from some forms
of treatment for adults, since children typically undergo psychosocial therapy
sessions only, and the focus of treatment is designed to instill positive
identification of the child with the child's biological sex.294 Adult males whose
overt signs of GID appear later and more gradually in adulthood tend to be
more ambivalent about SRS and are also "less likely to be satisfied after
surgery.,295 There are reported cases of spontaneous remission of GID in adults
who develop symptoms later in life.296 The inconsistency of the diagnosis of
GID with the passage of time and other variables, the mistaken confusion of
sexual preference with gender confusion, and the possibility of remission of
GID underscore the dangerous use of a psychological definition of sex as the
basis for a legal definition of sex.
For transsexuals, SRS cannot serve as a bright line to determine sex. SRS is
not always the proposed treatment for GID.29 7 The Harry Benjamin
289. See George A. Rekers, Childhood Sexual Identity Disorders, 15 MED. ASPECTS OF
HUMAN SEXUALrTY, 141 (1981); HANDBOOK OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT SEXUAL PROBLEMS 3-13
(George A. Rekers, ed. 1995).
290. Id. See also GEORGE A REKERs, GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER OF CHILDHOOD, BAKER'S
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 446-48 (David G. Benner, ed. 1985).
291. EARLY DETECTION AND TREATMENT OF SEXUAL PROBLEMS 3-13, 272-89 (George A.
Rekers, ed., 1995).
292. Kenneth Zucker & Susan Bradley, GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER AND PSYCHOSEXUAL
PROBLEMS IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 281-82 (1995) (stating that in a sizeable number of
cases GID in children resolves).
293. See NARTH, supra note 263.
294. Id.
295. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 183, at §302.85.
296. See Gender Identity Disorder, available at http://cms.psychologytoday.com/conditi
ons/genderid.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
297. HARRY BENJAMIN, INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION'S STANDARDS OF
CARE FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS (6th vers., 2001).
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who develop symptoms later in life. 296 The inconsistency of the diagnosis of
GID with the passage of time and other variables, the mistaken confusion of
sexual preference with gender confusion, and the possibility of remission of
GID underscore the dangerous use of a psychological definition of sex as the
basis for a legal definition of sex.
For transsexuals, SRS cannot serve as a bright line to determine sex. SRS is
not always the proposed treatment for GID.29 7 The Harry Benjamin
International Association Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders
noted that some individuals diagnosed with GID neither desired nor were
candidates for SRS.298 A person claiming the same cognitive dissonance
between perceived and actual sex could argue that sex should be determined
solely by subjective mental thoughts. Such a person may contend that SRS is
not desired, is too expensive, or is contraindicated due to some secondary
medical condition.299 Thus, SRS cannot be deemed the threshold over which
one must cross to legally change sex. Subjective mental thoughts about sex are
too amorphous to use as a baseline to establish sex. The only line to draw must
be with the biological and not the psychological pen.
The modem approach to treatment of GID highlights the importance of
cognitive styles and nonsurgical psychological treatments, despite the earlier
emphasis on SRS, as propagated in 1966 by Harry Benjamin.300 The use of
cognitive-behavioral therapy in treating GID is important due to the
psychological etiology of GID. A 1976 study found that gender dysphoria was
caused by an excessive identification of patients with their mothers, and the
inability of these mothers to permit their sons to separate from their mother's
bodies-resulting in an etiology of mother-infant symbiosis and absent
fathers.301 In the same vein, a study in 1992 proposed that persons with GID
seemed to have similar mental dimensions to those who suffered from chronic
depressive disorders. 30 2 Despite thirty years of research on gender dysphoria,
there is a marked lack of research on the "broader issues of cognitive style and
296. See Gender Identity Disorder, available at http://cms.psychologytoday.com/conditi
ons/genderid.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
297. HARRY BENJAMIN, INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA AssOcIATION's STANDARDs OF
CARE FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS (6th vers., 2001).
298. Id.
299. For example, surgery may be impossible due to severe coronary disease or some other
medical condition.
300. Kenny Midence & Isabel Hargreaves, Psychosocial Adjustment in Male-to-Female
Transsexuals: An Overview of the Research Evidence, 131 J. OF PSYCHOLOGY 602 (1997).
301. Id. at 604.
302. Id. at611.
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functioning, thought processes and cognitive maturation as they may be related
to the organization and evolution of gender structures."
30 3
There are also various ethical concerns that arise in the use of SRS to treat
GID. Part of the ethical code of the helping professions is that treatment must
have beneficence and the patient has the right to treatment with the least drastic
alternative. 3°4 Beneficence or responsible care means that psychologists engage
in actions that are "likely to benefit others, or at least do no harm. 305 A study in
1978 showed that those who regretted having SRS shared the following
characteristics in common: inadequate family support, inadequate self-support,
inappropriate physical build, and heterosexual experience following SRS.3°6 A
study of transsexual satisfaction in 1965 showed that more than thirty-three
percent attempted suicide post-surgery, and more than twenty-five percent
appeared to have a schizoid or personality disorder.30 7 A study of male-to-
female transsexuals in 1981 showed that twenty-four percentofSRS outcomes
were unsatisfactory.
308
Psychiatric diagnoses change over time, as evidenced by the ever-changing
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ("DSM").3°9 For example, multiple
personality disorder was recognized in the DSM HI-R under its traditional
name, but in the manual, DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR, it appears as disassociative
identity disorder.31 ° Since psychiatric diagnoses are subject to change, and
since the disorder is subject to change during a person's life, it is precarious to
rest a legal definition of sex on a constantly moving premise.
Some contend that gender identity is defined by how a person feels at any
given moment. 311 The fallacy in relying on the subjective is that sex becomes
merely afeeling. Human feeling, by definition capricious, cannot be a standard
upon which our judicial system relies-sex cannot be determined by a
303. Id. at611.
304. Susan Jacob-Timm, Ethical and Legal Issues Associated with the Use ofAversives in
the Public Schools: the SIBIS Controversy, 25 THE SCH. PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 190 (1996).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 191.
308. Id.
309. Ivan Leudar & Wes Sharrock, Multiplying the Multiplicity: Are Dissociative Identity
Disorders 'Real'?, 90 BRITISH J. OF PSYCHOLOGY 451 (1999). The DSM is a manual published
by the American Psychiatric Association which addresses mental disorders for children and
adults. Mental health professionals use the DSM for diagnostic and treatment protocol.
310. Id.
311. KATE BORNsTEIN, MY GENDER WORKBOOK: How TO BECOME A REAL MAN, A REAL
WOMAN, THE REAL You, OR SOMETHING ELSE ENTIRELY 8 (1998).
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balancing of masculine and feminine feelings. Rather, sex must be determined
by objective and immutable standards.
The problem of defining sex psychologically is best illustrated by
considering another mental disorder, known as Apotemnophilia or Body
Integrity Identity Disorder ("BlID").312 Apotemnophiles feel that they are a
disabled person trapped in a nondisabled body (not unlike believing one is a
man trapped in a woman's body).313 Clinicians generally recognize this
disorder as a paraphilia, or a displaced sexual desire such as transvestism,
voyeurism, pedophilia, and bestiality.
314
Apotemnophilia is a condition where one has an overwhelming desire to
amputate his or her own body parts for sexual purposes or be with an amputee
sexually.315 Dr. Greg Furth "is a longtime crusader for increased BIID research.
He has also been trying for many years to persuade doctors to cut off his right
312. A group of clinicians at Columbia University have set up a web site providing
information and have sought to rename the disorder as "Body Integrity Identity Disorder" or
BIID. See Body Integrity Identity Disorder, http://www.biid.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
313. Richard L. Bruno, Devotees, Pretenders and Wannabes: Two Cases of Factitious
Disability Disorder, 15 J. SExuALrry & DISABILrrY 243, 251 (1997). See also Audiey Kao, The
Difficult Appendage, available at http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2001/09/dyknl -0109.html
(last visited Sept. 6, 2008); Thomas M. Wise & Ram Chandran Kalyanam, Amputee Fetishism
and Genital Mutilation: Case Report and Literature Review, 26 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY
339, 341 (2000).
314. Carl Elliott, Costing an Arm and a Leg: The Victims of a Growing Mental Disorder are
Obsessed with Amputation, SLATE.COM, July 10, 2003, available at http://slate.msn.com/id
/2085402/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2008) ("Baz remembers first seeing an amputee when he was a
4-year old boy in Liverpool. By the time he was 7 he had begun to think, 'This is the way I
should be.' It was not until Baz was in his 50s, however, that he actually had his leg amputated.
Baz froze his leg in dry ice until it was irreversibly damaged, then persuaded a surgeon to
complete the job. When he awoke from the anesthetic and his left leg was gone, he says, 'All
my torment had disappeared."'). The term ending with "philia" identifies this condition as a
sexual disorder. The first cataloging of sexual disorders in 1866 referred to self-mutilation. See
RICHARD VON KRAFT-EBING, PSYCHOPATHIA SEXUALIS (1953); see also John Money, Russell
Jobaris & George Furth, Apotemnophilia: Two Cases of Self-demand Amputation as a
Paraphilia, 13 J. SEX RESEARCH 115 (1977); Carl Elliott, A New Way to Be Mad, 283 THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 72-84 (Dec. 2000); Carl Elliott, Healthy Limb Amputation: Ethical and
Legal Aspects, 2 CLINICAL MED. J. 431 (2002).
315. See Walter Everaerd, A Case ofApotemnophilia: A Handicap as a Sexual Preference,
37 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 285 (1983). The disorder was first called Apotemnophilia in 1977,
and for a short time was referred to as Amputee Identity Disorder. See GREGG M. FURTH &
ROBERT SMITH, AMPUTEE IDENTITY DISORDER: INFORMATION, QUESTIONS, ANSWERS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ABouT SELF DEMAND AMPUTATION (2000). Dr. Smith performed
amputations on apotemnophiles in Scotland until the British Medical Council made him stop.
See Shanna Liebman, Off With *y Arm, NEW YORK OBSERVER, available at
http://www.observer.com/2003/my-arm (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
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leg. 3 16 Although a seemingly obscure phenomenon, an entire subculture has
developed that advocates and caters to voluntary amputations. All one must do
is perform a simple internet search with 'the term "wannabe" (or "amputee
wannabe") for those who wish to have an amputation and "devotee" (or
"amputee devotee") for those who wish to have sexual relations with an
amputee.317 Apotemnophilia
is a psychological condition in which the individual requests an
elective amputation. Individuals with this condition experience the
persistent desire to have their body physically match the idealized
image they have of themselves. This desire forces individuals to
deal with the paradox of losing one or more major limbs (i.e. arm[s]
or leg[s]) to become whole. In their minds, "Less is more".31 8
According to researchers at Columbia University,
There are several conditions that may cause patients to seek
amputation. These include:
1. Transsexuals who usually mutilate only the genitals in order
to assume the physical appearance of the opposite sex.
2. Schizophrenics who may self-mutilate in response to voices
ordering them to do so or in response to a delusional belief that the
body part is defective or bad.
3. Patients with a personality disorder, who appear to mutilate to
relieve tension or gain secondary advancement.
4. Confused patients who may injure themselves due to
disinhibition, poor judgment or perceptual difficulties.
5. Depressed patients who may mutilate themselves in a failed
suicide attempt, or as atonement for perceived sins.
6. Patients with Body Dysmorphic Disorder who seek body
modification in response to some perceived physical imperfection.
7. Patients with Factitious Disorder are so eager to enter the sick
person's role that they will intentionally produce psychological or
physical symptoms.
8. BIID patients appear to seek amputation in order to achieve their
perceived body image.319
316. Id.
317. Some have classified "wannabes" as apotemnophilia, and "devotees" as
acrotomophilia. See BID Basics, http://www.biid.orgfbasics.php?page=06&lan=en (last
visited Sept. 6, 2008).
318. Id.
319. Id.
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The number of people who identify themselves as wannabes has grown
significantly in the past few years. One website boasts over 3,600 members.
320
The search retums several hundred results, and not surprisingly, most of these
people are affiliated with the transsexual movement. Some even call their
desire to remove a perfectly healthy limb transsexual in nature. For example,
proponents of amputation as a "cure" insist, much like transsexuals, that the
only way to help these mentally ill people is to mutilate their bodies to fit their
minds. To date, most of the American medical community still recognizes the
amputation of a perfectly healthy limb as unethical and surgeons in the United
States will not amputate the limbs of apotemnophiliacs. 321 If the state validates
the actions of the mentally ill by legally recognizing their "new" sex, the
outcome of such actions has the potential to lead to even more extreme
mutilations, such as the amputation of healthy limbs. A psychiatrist that
specializes in apotemnophilia cannot guarantee that after surgery to remove a
healthy limb the urge will not come back to remove more healthy limbs.
3122
Medical ethicist Arthur Caplan of the University of Pennsylvania says, "It's
absolute utter lunacy to go along with a request to maim somebody" either
sexually or physically. 323 He states that when a person is running around
convinced they want their leg (or anything else) chopped off, they are hardly
competent to make life-altering decisions.324
The emergence of apotemnophilia creates one of the strongest arguments
against allowing SRS. Indeed, the fact that most practitioners and wannabes
argue apotemnophilia is no different than GID and amputation is like SRS 325
"undermines the uniqueness of sex-change surgery and challenges the social
320. Carl Elliott, supra note 314.
321. People v. Brown, 91 Cal.App.4th 256, 259 (2001) (finding the defendant guilty of
murder for amputating a perfectly healthy limb of an apotemnophile in Mexico who later died of
gangrene).
322. Gerard Seenan, Healthy Limbs Cut Off at Patients Request, (Feb. 1,2000) available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uknews/story/0,3604,237010,00.html. If this is eventually allowed,
where do we draw the line? Only one limb per customer? Or one arm and one leg only? Or
could modem medicine potentially allow one to define his or her own existence by removing all
their limbs and becoming a stump if they realized their "true" existence was a stump trapped in a
healthy person's body? What if a self-inflicted amputee develops a tattoo or piercing syndrome
(where you can never have just one) and finds a surgeon to have the second or third limb
removed?
323. Randy Dotinga, Out on a Limb, (Aug. 29, 2000) available at http://dir.salon.com/story
/health/feature/2000/08/29/amputation/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
324. Id.
325. Everaerd, supra note 315, at 286 (quoting a patient, "Just as a transsexual is not happy
with his own body but longs to have the body of another sex, in the same way I am not happy
with my present body, but long for a peg leg.").
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value attributed to it."'3 26 One sufferer of apotemnophilia explains that the
desire to remove the limb becomes uncontrollable and the realization of the
limb's removal "has become indispensable for my happiness and peace of
mind. 3 27 This is the same basic reason given by transsexuals who desire to
"change" their sex by mutilating their bodies.328 One man who suffered from
an amputee fetish severed his penis with a tourniquet, catheter, and razor blade
following instructions obtained from the internet. He later questioned why he
had wanted to do this to himself in the first place.32 9 He became even more
depressed after the amputation than he was to begin with and cried when he
spoke of what he had done.
330
The man who severed his penis was lucky compared to the man who made
the only reported case to date in this country dealing with apotemnophilia.331
The latter did not live to shed tears about his decision. Gregg Furth and Philip
Bondy, sufferers of apotemnophilia, each made an appointment to have a leg
amputated with an underground surgeon in San Diego known unaffectionately
among the transsexual crowd as "Butcher Brown." Dr. John Ronald Brown
agreed to the operations as long as they were performed in Mexico. Although
Mr. Furth eventually backed out of the operation after seeing an assistant with a
large knife, Philip Bondy, a seventy-nine-year-old man, decided to go through
with the leg amputation. Bondy returned to California minus one leg and
checked into a motel where he died shortly thereafter of gas gangrene. At the
trial, Dr. Brown was found guilty of unlawful practice of medicine and
convicted of second-degree murder. 332  The appellate court affirmed the
decision.333
Regrettable trends in the psychiatric field such as transsexualism and
apotemnophilia are not uncommon. The reality of performing these mutilating
surgeries "did not derive from critical reasoning or thoughtful assessments" on
326. John Leo, The Sex-Change Boom, U.S. NEWS& WORLD REPORT, at 20 (Mar. 12,2001).
327. Everaerd, supra note 315, at 288-98.
328. "It is not obvious how this patient's feeling that he is a woman trapped in a man's body
differs from a feeling of a patient with anorexia nervosa that she is obese despite her emaciated,
cachectic state. We don't do liposuction on anorexics. Why amputate these poor men's
genitals? Surely the fault is in the mind, not the member." McHugh, supra note 199, at 193-94.
329. Wise & Kalyanam, supra note 313.
330. Id.
331. See People v. Brown, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
332. Id. at 259.
333. Id. at 268.
[Vol. 2:459
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 512 2007-2008
TRANSSEXUALISM AND THE BINARY DIVIDE
this mental illness. 334  When it follows cultural fashion, the practice of
psychiatry can result in "false, even disastrous, consequences., 335 There have
been huge glitches in psychiatric history that provide evidence as to why
psychiatry should not follow cultural trends. With respect to transsexualism
and apotemnophilia, history is repeating the blunder culturally motivated
psychiatric fads had on schizophrenics. 336  When the "anti-psychiatrists"
convinced the government and society that the schizophrenics were simply
misunderstood beings living an alternative lifestyle that needed to escape the
oppressive bounds of mental hospitals, they did so under a guise of freedom.
They had to convince others it was the social custom that was oppressive. In
other words, the schizophrenics were fine. The culture merely needed to accept
their alternate lifestyles. Some argued that schizophrenics were created by
outdated and nonprogressive cultural norms.337 Contrary to what those
advocating "freedom" predicted, the mentally ill did not function in society;
they suffered greatly as a result of this innovative idea.338 It became evident
that schizophrenics really were sick and incapable of functioning in society
after most of them ended up homeless. Similarly, there are contemporary
efforts to declassify transsexualism as a mental disorder and to transform
society into acceptance rather than treating the disorder.
339
According to one medical ethicist, if the apotemnophiliac movement were to
become accepted, as its sister disorder transsexualism is becoming, the law
would in fact view voluntary amputation the same as some advocates want the
334. See McHugh, supra note 199, at 194. "The zeal for this sex-change surgery-perhaps,
with the exception of frontal lobotomy, the most radical therapy ever encouraged by twentieth
century psychiatrists-did not derive from critical reasoning or thoughtful assessments." Id.
335. Id. at 188. When a new hysteria arises in popular culture such as the need to release
schizophrenics from the oppression of hospitals and free them from psychiatry altogether so they
could live their "alternative" lifestyles in the 60s or the therapy-induced "remembrance" of
sexual abuse that allegedly caused so many cases of Multiple Personality Disorder in the 90s,
disaster has inevitably followed. See id. at 187-202.
336. See id. at 187-202. "This interrelationship of cultural antinomianism and a psychiatric
misplaced emphasis is seen at its grimmest in the practice known as sex reassignment surgery."
Id. at 192.
337. Id. at 187-91.
338. Id. at 498-99.
339. Carroll et al., supra note 242, at 134
We believe clinicians need to rethink their assumptions about gender, sexuality,
and sexual orientation and to adopt a "trans-positive" or "trans-affirmative"
disposition to counseling. A trans-affirmative approach necessitates that
counselors affirm transgendered persons; advocate for political, social, economic
rights for the transgendered; and educate others about such issues.
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law to view SRS.340 Professor Mason opined that "as long as you say that
people can have a sex change for what is a severe psychological disease then it
is difficult to say you cannot have an amputation for this form of severe
psychological disease. 34' Conferring legal status upon transsexuals opens a
Pandora's Box, not only undermining equal protection, but objective law itself.
V. CONCLUSION
From founding of the country to the present, the public policy, as reflected
in the common and statutory law, recognizes marriage exclusively between one
man and one woman. For purposes of marriage, sex has always been assumed
to be binary-male and female. Sex, like race, is an immutable characteristic.
However, some transsexual advocates argue that sex should not be considered
static. They argue that sex should not be determined by objective factors such
as biology or physiology but by subjective mental desires. This line of
reasoning is fraught with problems.
If sex is primarily a state of mind which is subject to change over time, then
equal protection for sex-based classifications becomes meaningless. To have
any meaning at all, sex must continue to be immutable under the law. Sex must
be determined by objective factors based on biology and physiology. While
plastic surgery may alter a person's physical appearance, it does not change a
person's birth sex. SRS is controversial and cannot be the bright line
determinate of a person's sex. If sex were determined primarily by subjective
mental musings, then an argument could be made that SRS is not necessary.
What should the law do with a transsexual who, after undergoing SRS, decides
to revert back to the original birth sex? Moreover, what should the law do with
a person suffering from GID when the desire to be the opposite sex remits or
disappears? If the law recognized that sex is subjective, a person could be born
one sex, later acknowledged by the law to become another, and then again later
determined by law to revert to the original sex. Such a result is absolutely
absurd. Sex can, and must, be determined by objective biological and
physiological factors.
340. See Seenan, supra note 322.
341. Id.
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APPENDICES
I. INTERSEX CONDITIONS
DISORDER FEATURES SEX TESTING
0
0
r
Androgen XY Lacks the androgen receptor Female PCR test will
Insensitivity gene, so develops as a discover a lack of
Syndrome female may or may not have SRY gene or a
testes mutation of it
Partial XY Androgen receptor there, Probably PCR test
Androgen but doesn't function female but
Insensitivity properly ambiguous depends
Syndrome genitalia
Congenital XX Blockage in adrenal Sometimes PCR test on X
Adrenal pathway causing genitalia chromosome
Hyperplasia overproduction of androgen appear more
masculinization of a female male,
*Progestin child in utero ambiguous sometimes not
Induced genitalia
Virilization
has similar
effects, but
was caused
by the drug
progestin,
dispensed
in the 50s
and 60s to
prevent
miscarriage
- no longer
used
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Gonadal XY Have mutations or deletions Female PCR test
dysgenesis of the SRY gene, born as
normal females but do not
have secondary sex
characteristics, do not
menstruate
Mosaicism XY/ Some cells contain XY Peripheral blood
XX chromosomes and some karyotyping,
cells contain XX testicular biopsy
chromosomes, resulting in with karyotyping.
ambiguous genitalia
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II. SEX CHROMOSOME ANEUPLOIDIES
DISORDER FEATURES SEX TESTING
0
0
0
Klinefelter's XXY Overwhelmingly male, Male Blood
Syndrome though most of the time karyotyping to
sterile and there may be some detect the extra
female breast development. X chromosome
Many men with KS are never
diagnosed.
Turner's XO Female, sometimes have a Female Blood
Syndrome webbed neck, generally will karyotyping to
not develop breasts or grow detect lack of
to normial height unless given second X
hormone therapy, infertility chromosome
but can carry a child
Triple X XXX Sometimes lower intelligence Female Blood
I _karyotyping
XYY Above average height, Male Blood
I sometimes lower intelligence karyotyping
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HI. OTHER
Neither intersex nor aneuploidies, but some have erroneously categorized as intersex.
DISORDER FEATURES SEX TESTING
0
Late Onset Can Normal XY males at XY- male PCR test on X
Congenital happen birth - main symptom XX-female chromosome
Adrenal either is scalp hair thinning
Hyperplasia to XY
or XX Normal XX female at
birth - symptoms can
be infertility, acne,
sometimes mild
clitoromegaly
(enlarging of clitoris),
but many affected are
asymptomatic
Vaginal XX Normal ovaries, uterus, Female Physical exam
Agenesis but third portion of
vagina failed to
develop and was
replaced by fibrous
tissue. Is corrected by
surgery.
Hypospadias XY Urethra located at base Male Physical exam
of penis, some have
chordee (bending of
penis with erection)
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IV. CHROMOSOME TESTING
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